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Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession:
An Empirical Study
JUSTIN D. LEVINSON* & DANIELLE YOUNG**
ABSTRACT
Commentators have marveled at the continuing lack of gender diversity in the legal
profession’s most influential and honored positions. After achieving near equal numbers
of male and female law school graduates for approximately two decades, the gap between
men and women in law firms, legal academia, and the judiciary remains stark. Several
scholars have argued that due to negative stereotypes portraying women either as
workplace cutthroats or, conversely, as secretaries or housewives, decision-makers
continue to subordinate women to men in the highest levels of the legal profession.
Despite these compelling arguments, no empirical studies have tested whether implicit
gender bias might explain the disproportionately low number of women attorneys in
leadership roles.
In order to test the hypothesis that implicit gender bias drives the continued
subordination of women in the legal profession, we designed and conducted an empirical
study. The study tested whether law students hold implicit gender biases related to
women in the legal profession, and further tested whether these implicit biases predict
discriminatory decision-making. The results of the study were both concerning and
hopeful. As predicted, we found that implicit biases were pervasive; a diverse group of
both male and female law students implicitly associated judges with men, not women,
and also associated women with the home and family. Yet the results of the remaining
portions of the study offered hope. Participants were frequently able to resist their
implicit biases and make decisions in gender neutral ways. Taken together, the results of
the study highlight two conflicting sides of the ongoing gender debate: first, that the
power of implicit gender biases persists, even in the next generation of lawyers; and
second, that the emergence of a new generation of egalitarian law students may offer
some hope for the future.
INTRODUCTION
Commentators have marveled at the continuing lack of gender diversity in
the legal profession’s most influential and honored positions. The passage of
time, for years cited as a reason for hope, has failed to put a major dent in the
huge disparities in both career advancement and pay. After achieving near
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equal numbers of male and female law school graduates for approximately two
decades,1 the gap between men and women in law firms, legal academia, and
the judiciary remains stark. For example, only six percent of managing partners
at the largest 200 American law firms are women2 and approximately four out of
five law school deans are men.3 Scholarship focusing on the continuing gender
gap has been detailed and interdisciplinary, offering a variety of potential
explanations for the continued problem.4 Of these explanations, the most
convincing have been science-based, relying on the powerful role of implicit
gender stereotypes. Scholars have argued that due to negative stereotypes
portraying women either as workplace cutthroats or, conversely, as secretaries
or housewives, decision-makers continue to subordinate women to men in the
highest levels of the legal profession.5 Despite these compelling arguments,
many of which are grounded in social science theory, no empirical studies have
tested whether implicit gender bias might explain the disproportionately low
number of women attorneys in leadership roles.

1. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS & THE NAWL FOUNDATION, REPORT OF THE
FOURTH ANNUAL NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS (2009)
[hereinafter Fourth Annual National Survey]; see also Elizabeth H. Gorman & Julie A. Kmec,
Hierarchical Rank and Women’s Organizational Mobility: Glass Ceilings in Corporate Law Firms, 114 AM. J.
SOC. 1428, 1429 (2009) (surmising that “the passage of time has undermined the view that not
enough women have yet made their way through the ‘pipeline’ to higher organizational levels”).
2. Fourth Annual National Survey, supra note 1, at 2.
3. Patti Abdullina, Statistical Report on Law School Faculty and Candidates for Law Faculty
Positions, ASS’N. AM. LAW SCH., http://www.aals.org/statistics/2009dlt/titles.html (last visited Oct.
25, 2010).
4. See e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Subtle Side of Sexism, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 613 (2007)
[hereinafter Rhode, Subtle Side]; Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
39 (1994); Susan Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations about Women, the
Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119, 122 (1997) (suggesting that the
notion of “lawyer as gladiator,” rather than “lawyer as problem-solver,” heightens gender bias in the
legal profession); Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate
Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 401, 439
(2003).
5. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's Advancement in the
Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 295-96 (1995) (discussing the role of gender stereotypes in
New York law firms); Iman Syeda Ali, Article, Bringing Down the “Maternal Wall”: Reforming the
FMLA to Provide Equal Employment Opportunities for Caregivers, 27 LAW & INEQ. 181, 182 (2009);
Rhode, Subtle Side, supra note 4, at 615 (“[G]ender stereotypes and unconscious bias concerning
female competence and appropriately feminine behavior constitute significant barriers, particularly
to leadership positions.”); Yvonne A. Tamayo, Rhymes With Rich: Power, Law, and the Bitch, 21 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 281, 282 (2009).
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In order to test the hypothesis that implicit gender bias6 drives the
continued subordination of women in the legal profession, we designed and
conducted an empirical study. The study tested whether people hold implicit
gender stereotypes of women in the legal profession, and further tested whether
these implicit stereotypes predict discriminatory decision-making. Specifically,
the experiment consisted of several measures. First, based on the stereotype of
male leaders and women clerical workers, we created and conducted a new
Implicit Association Test (IAT), the “Judge/Gender IAT,” a reaction-time based
measure that tests whether people7 hold implicit associations between men and
judges and women and paralegals. Next, due to the stereotype of men as
professionals and women as homemakers, we employed a well-known IAT that
tests whether people associate men with the workplace and women with the
home and family. In addition to testing for implicit gender bias in the legal
setting, we also tested whether gender stereotypes predict biased decisionmaking. We thus included three additional gender-based measures in our
study: a law firm hiring measure (participants were asked to select a candidate
to hire), a judicial appointments measure (participants were asked to rank the
desirability of masculine and feminine traits in appellate judges), and a law
student organization budget cut measure (participants were asked to reallocate
funds in response to budget cuts).
The results of the study were both concerning and hopeful. As predicted,
we found that a diverse group of both male and female law students implicitly
associated judges with men, not women, and also associated women with the
home and family. For these implicit measures, results of the study indicated
that law students were much like other studied populations in related IAT
studies: implicit gender biases were pervasive. In addition, the results showed
that for both male and female participants, their implicit gender biases predicted
some, but not all, of their decisions on the remaining studies. For example, the
more strongly male participants associated judges with men in the
Judge/Gender IAT, the more they preferred that appellate judges possess
masculine (compared to feminine) characteristics. This result demonstrates that
implicit gender biases can affect decision-making.
The results of the remaining studies offered hope, however. Participants
were frequently able to resist their implicit biases and make decisions in genderneutral ways. In fact, for the resume study, male law student participants even
6. Many legal scholars have previously called this phenomenon “unconscious bias.” See, e.g.,
Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317, 331-36 (1987) (introducing the concept to legal scholarship). Because social scientists prefer the
term “implicit” to “unconscious,” we will generally use this term except when referring to existing
scholarship that uses the term “unconscious.” We mean the term “implicit” to describe attitudes,
memories, and stereotypes that are outside of “conscious, attentional control.” See Anthony G.
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946
(2006); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497-1539 (2005) (explaining
the foundations of scientific research on implicit attitudes). For an explanation of why psychologists
prefer the term “implicit” to “unconscious,” see Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit
Measures in Social Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 303 (2003).
7. In our study, we tested law students, a group that presumably should strive for gender
neutrality.
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preferred female candidates to male candidates and held other pro-female job
attitudes. Additionally, for the budget cut study, law student participants were
no more likely to cut funds from a women’s organization than from other
organizations. Taken together, the results of our study highlight two conflicting
sides of the ongoing gender debate: first, that the power of implicit gender
biases persists, even in the next generation of lawyers; and second, that the
emergence of a new generation of egalitarian law students may offer some hope
for the future.
This Article considers implicit bias based theories of gender inequality in
the legal profession and details the empirical study we conducted. Section II
delineates the seriousness of the problem by providing a statistical overview of
gender disparities in the legal profession. It then examines scholarship linking
implicit gender stereotypes to gender disparities in the legal profession. It notes
that although much legal scholarship hypothesizes that gender stereotypes
(particularly those linking women to the home or family, questionable
workplace character traits, or low status jobs) play a pernicious role in
subordinating women, none have tested the hypothesis empirically.
Section III begins by reviewing the few empirical studies that have
investigated continuing gender disparities in the legal profession. These studies
have tested a variety of worthy hypotheses, such as the connection between
masculine job descriptions and subsequent hiring, but have yet to examine the
potential role of implicit gender bias in the legal profession. The section then
sets the stage for our empirical study by outlining our research goals for the
study, as well as providing a scientific overview of the IAT in the legal context.
Section IV provides the particulars of the empirical study we conducted, from
methods to results. It describes in detail the law student participants we
recruited and the materials we used in the study. The results confirm implicit
gender biases among law students, but simultaneously offer hope that some of
these biases may be resisted. Section V provides a roadmap for future research
on implicit gender bias in the legal profession and considers the implementation
of debiasing measures. Section VI concludes.
II. GENDER STEREOTYPES AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. The Statistics
Startling statistics document the disappointing state of gender equality
among high-level attorneys. According to a 2009 report by the National
Association of Women Lawyers, women are grossly underrepresented in
leadership roles in the legal profession.8 The report, which tracked the progress
of women in the nation’s largest 200 firms, found that only six percent of firms
have women managing partners,9 fifteen percent of firms have at least one
woman on their management committee, and fewer than sixteen percent of firm

8. Fourth Annual National Survey, supra note 1, at 2-5.
9. Id. at 2. The report also notes that in 2006, just five percent of managing partners were
women. Id. at 6.
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equity partners are women.10 Furthermore, males comprise the highest paid
partners at ninety-nine percent of the nation’s top firms.11
This
underrepresentation is particularly startling considering that law schools have
been graduating equal numbers of women and men over the past two decades.12
The number of women in leadership roles in the nation’s courts and law
schools is only slightly better than in the private sector. Statistics show that less
than thirty percent of judges in federal and state courts are women, including
federal district court judges (25%),13 federal appeals court judges (29%),14 and
state court judges (26%).15 Within the leadership of legal academia, the gender
gap is similarly stark. In 2008-2009, for example, there were four times more
male than female law school deans.16 In addition, women held less than thirty
percent of coveted tenure track and tenured faculty positions (29%).17
The numbers make clear that the gender gap amongst leaders in the legal
profession persists, and does so in an alarming fashion. Yet there is no scholarly
consensus for the reasons behind the disparities. In the next subsections, we
focus on a leading explanation—that implicit gender stereotypes lead to the
continued subordination of women in the legal profession.18
B. A Brief Primer on Gender Stereotypes
Before turning to legal scholarship linking gender stereotypes to the
continuing subordination of women in the legal profession and beyond, we first
provide a social science-based overview of gender stereotypes.19 One of the
most telling facts about stereotypes is that they emerge early in life, often
influencing children as young as three years old.20 These impressionable

10. Id. at 2. Even the female lawyers who are equity partners make substantially less than their
male counterparts. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 10.
12. Id. at 7.
13. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., Women in the Judiciary, (2010), available at
http:// lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/numberofwomeninjudiciary09.pdf.
14. Id.
15. 2010 Representation of United States State Court Women Judges, NAT’L ASS’N WOMEN JUDGES,
http://www.nawj.org/us_state_court_statistics_2010.asp (citing THE AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF
THE NATION (2010)).
16. Abdullina, supra note 3. According to the report, there were forty-one female deans and 158
male deans.
17. Id. By contrast, a majority of less elite non-tenure track positions are held by women. Id.
18. This sets the stage for our empirical study. See infra Section IV for a detailed description of
the study.
19. Social science work on stereotypes is comprehensive. This section provides just an
abbreviated summary of the relevant work. For more on stereotypes, their activation, and their
effects, see generally Patricia G. Devine, Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping: How Automatic Are They?
Introduction to the Special Section, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 757 (2001); Daniel T. Gilbert & J.
Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509 (1991); Ziva Kunda & Steven J. Spencer, When Do Stereotypes Come
to Mind and When Do They Color Judgment? A Goal-Based Theoretical Framework for Stereotype Activation
and Application, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 522 (2003).
20. Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85
B.U. L. REV. 155, 203-04 (2005).
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children, who are constantly engaged in interpreting the world around them,
quickly learn to ascribe certain characteristics to members of distinct ethnic and
social groups.21 Such associations derive from cultural and social beliefs, and
are learned directly from multiple sources, including the children’s parents,
peers, and the media.22 As the children grow older, their stereotypes harden.23
Although they may develop non-biased (explicit) views of the world, their
stereotypes remain largely unchanged and become implicit (or automatic).24 In
the context of gender stereotypes, children are likely to learn at an early age that
men are “competent, rational, assertive, independent, objective, and self
confident,” and women are “emotional, submissive, dependent, tactful, and
gentle.”25
Once adults have ingrained implicit biases, the stereotypes they learned as
children continue to affect the way they perceive the world. That is, people
perceive information in ways that conform to their stereotypes.26 Gary Blasi
provides two brief exercises that help illustrate how the simple associations
people learn as children affect the way they think about gender and career: First,
“try to imagine, in sequence, a baseball player, a trial lawyer, a figure skater,
and a U.S. Supreme Court justice - without a specific gender or race. . . .”27 Did
you succeed?28 Next, “try to imagine a carpenter. When you have that image
settled in your mind, describe the color of her hair.”29 Did you pause or do a
double-take?30 Blasi’s exercises help illustrate the simple gender-based hurdles
the mind must make in even basic career related situations. If we immediately
picture a man when we think about a trial lawyer, for example, what might that
mean for women seeking to reach the pinnacle of the profession?
Although Blasi’s examples are concerning enough, gender stereotypes can
play even more complicated mental tricks than the previous perception tasks
illustrate. They have, for example, been shown to affect the way people make
judgments about others and even change the way people remember
information.31 In a study testing how implicit gender stereotypes can change the
way people evaluate others’ traits and behaviors, Mahzarin Banaji and her
colleagues primed gender stereotypes by exposing participants to phrases
related to the female stereotype of dependence (e.g. some participants saw the
21. Rhode, Subtle Side, supra note 4, at 618.
22. Page, supra note 20, at 203.
23. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 363 (2007).
24. Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 101, 104 (2000).
25. Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: Historical and Legal Perspectives of
Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 581, 604 (1997) (explaining “these characterizations of
women nevertheless prevent women from sharing fully in all levels of society, including in the work
environment, because the traits associated with men and women are valued differently”).
26. Rhode, Subtle Side, supra note 4, at 618.
27. Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA
L. REV. 1241, 1256 (2002).
28. Blasi doubts it, and so do we. See id.
29. Id. at 1255.
30. Blasi predicts that most people will, and here again, we agree. See id. at 1255-56.
31. Williams, supra note 4. See generally Levinson, supra note 23 (providing evidence of the
power of stereotypes on the way people remember and misremember facts).
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phrase “never leaves home”).32 Banaji and her colleagues predicted that this
simple act, exposing participants to dependence related phrases, would trigger a
broader set of female stereotypes that would affect the way participants would
later evaluate women’s behaviors.33 Thus, after telling participants that they
were beginning an unrelated study,34 the researchers asked participants to read
short stories about a person (either male or female) and rate the person’s level of
dependence, inhibition, insecurity, and passivity (all confirmed female
stereotypes).35 The results showed that study participants who previously had
their gender stereotypes activated were more likely (than a control group whose
stereotypes were not activated) to evaluate a woman’s behavior as dependent,
inhibited, insecure, passive, and weak.36
The study demonstrates the
dangerousness and sensitivity of activated gender stereotypes, particularly their
ability to change the way people interpret and attribute women’s behavior.37
A second study confirms the dangerousness of gender stereotypes, this
time by focusing on how gender stereotypes can actually facilitate the creation
of false memories.38 In this study, Alison Lenton and her colleagues presented
participants with a list of words.39 Some of the word lists were stereotypic of
women (such as secretary and nurse), and others were stereotypic of men (such
as lawyer and soldier). After briefly distracting participants, the researchers
asked the participants to identify the words they had seen.40 Results showed
that participants used gender stereotypes in creating false memories. That is,

32. Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., Implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 272, 274 (1993). Other participants were exposed to phrases related to the male stereotype
of aggression (e.g. “threatens other people”). Id. Participants in the control conditions were exposed
to neutral phrases (e.g. “crossed the street”). Id.
33. Id. at 273. Similarly, they predicted that exposing participants to the aggression-related
phrases would trigger male stereotypes, and that these stereotypes would change the way people
evaluated subsequent behaviors by men. Id.
34. Id. at 274. At the end of the study, the researchers confirmed that the participants did not
suspect that the two studies were related. Id.
35. Id. The researchers also had the participants rate a variety of other traits, including
unrelated positive and negative traits. Id. at 275.
36. Id.
37. This study also demonstrates that stereotypes need to be activated in order to be most
harmful. Unfortunately, as the study and other studies show, stereotypes are activated very easily.
See, e.g., Devine, supra note 19, at 759; Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias:
Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 327-28
(2010) (providing examples); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and
Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (2001); Laurie
A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to Violent and Misogynous
Rap Music, 4 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133 (2002) (finding that simply playing music to
participants can prime harmful stereotypes).
38. Much of this paragraph, and the description of the Lenton study (including footnotes), in
particular, is more or less verbatim from Levinson’s work. See Levinson, supra note 23, at 379.
39. Alison P. Lenton et al., Illusions of Gender: Stereotypes Evoke False Memories, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3, 5-6 (2001). All participants were shown seventy-five words that
constituted gender-neutral roles and fifteen words that were gender stereotypes. Of these fifteen
words, half of the participants received female stereotype roles and half received male stereotype
roles. To obfuscate the gender context, the list of gender-specific stereotype roles was surrounded
by the other sixty words. Id.
40. Id. at 6.
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they more often (incorrectly) reported that they had seen gender stereotyped
words than non-gender-stereotyped words.41 Results also indicated that these
false memories were elicited implicitly (i.e., automatically). Despite the nature
of their errors, most participants were completely unaware of the gender
stereotype theme of the word lists.42 The researchers expressed concern that the
implicit creation of stereotype-consistent false memories may help to explain the
“self-perpetuating nature of stereotypes and their resistance to change.”43
Research on stereotype biased perception, information processing, and
memory each demonstrate the dangerous potential that implicit gender biases
may have in the employer-employee relationship.44 We next turn to legal
scholarship and review the ways legal scholars have argued that these gender
stereotypes might explain continuing gender disparities.
C. Do Gender Stereotypes Explain Gender Disparities?
Commentators have offered a variety of explanations for the continuing
gender disparities, and the debate continues. Some of the most interesting
scholarly arguments range from those downplaying the numbers in light of the
potential promise of future amelioration (claiming the low number of women in
law school thirty years ago explains the small number of women judges today)45

41. Id. at 7.
42. Id. The researchers considered the low awareness level to support a theory of implicit
activation of stereotype-consistent information. Id. at 10.
43. Id. at 11-12.
44. One study that helps explain how implicit gender stereotypes might affect various stages of
the employee-employer relationship was conducted by Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore.
Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association Test, 10 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 361-65 (2007). The researchers were interested in whether
implicit associations and stereotypes, as measured by the IAT, would predict the way study
participants (in their study, undergraduate students) acted. Id. at 365. They examined this in two
ways: (1) by testing whether participants’ implicit biases predicted their level of (self-reported)
discriminatory acts in Study 1, and (2) by testing whether participants’ implicit biases predicted the
way they would allocate funds when faced with a budget cut in Study 2. Id. at 361-65. In Study 2,
participants were informed that a university-wide budget cut would affect student organizations’
budgets and were asked to reallocate budget amounts to various student organizations. Id. at 364.
The researchers measured whether implicit stereotypes the participants had about certain groups
(namely Jews, Blacks and Asians) would predict how much money they cut from the original
budgets of those organizations. Id. Results of this study confirmed the researchers’ hypotheses in
both studies. Id. at 368. Participants’ implicit stereotypes predicted both their levels of self-reported
discriminatory acts, as well as the amount of money they cut from certain student organizations. Id.
The stronger the implicit stereotypes they held, the more racial and ethnic bias they displayed in
their actions and decisions. Id. at 368-69. We loosely based part of our empirical study (the budgetcut measure) on Rudman and Ashmore’s study.
45. See Gend. Bias in the Courts Task Force, Gender Bias in the Courts of the Commonwealth: Final
Report, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 705, 792 (2001). We expect that variations of the history
argument will gain strength in light of the confirmation of Elena Kagan to the United States Supreme
Court, raising the composition of women on the Supreme Court to thirty-three percent. During
times of success for underrepresented individuals, it is typical to see resistance to the notion that
inequality pervades. Thus, we would expect to see similar resurgence of the history argument as
individual women enjoy various career successes. One example of the connection between history
arguments and career success is the emergence of what some people call a “post-racial” America in
the aftermath of President Obama’s election. For critiques of this “post-racial” notion, see generally
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to relying on gender differences in intentional career choices (e.g. women
disproportionately “opt out” of the leadership race).46 Perhaps the most
compelling subset of scholarship, however, focuses on the ways in which gender
stereotypes about women may affect women’s hiring and career advancement
and ultimately exclude large numbers of women from leadership positions.47
Legal scholarship discussing the impact of gender stereotypes on the
leadership progression of women has been both diverse and comprehensive,
and taken together it tends to support three main themes: first, stereotypes
linking women to the home and family affect their prospects for career
advancement; second, stereotypes about women’s work styles, character traits,
and job competencies hinder their ability to land and advance in high level
leadership positions; and third, because certain jobs are consciously or
unconsciously perceived as male jobs, females will be evaluated less favorably
for those positions. This subsection provides a brief overview of legal
scholarship that connects gender stereotypes to women’s limited career
advancement, focusing on the three main themes stated above.
The first theme that has emerged in legal scholarship is that stereotypes
linking women to the home and family affect women’s prospects for hiring and
career advancement.48 Deborah Rhode, a leading scholar in examining gender
disparities in the workplace, argues that this “subtle side of sexism” manifests in
a variety of automatic ways that may be neither obvious nor intentional.49 For
Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-race Equal Protection? 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010); Camille A. Nelson, Racial
Paradox and Eclipse: Obama as a Balm for What Ails Us, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 743 (2009); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr. & Johanna Wald, After Shirley Sherrod, We All Need to Slow Down and Listen, WASH. POST,
July 25, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/23/
AR2010072304583.html; Kathleen Schmidt & Brian A. Nosek, Implicit (and Explicit) Racial Attitudes
Barely Changed During Barack Obama’s Presidential Campaign and Early Presidency, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 308 (2010) (showing psychological evidence that President Obama’s rise to the
presidency did little to change implicit racial bias).
46. See Rhode, Subtle Side, supra note 4, at 615-17 (critiquing this scholarship) (citing Lisa Belkin,
The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, at 42; Ann Marsh, Mommy, Me, and an
Advanced Degree, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2002, at 1; JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW,
"OPT OUT" OR PUSHED OUT? HOW THE PRESS COVERS WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT 4-6 (2006), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/OptOutPushedOut.pdf).
47. See also David L. Faigman et al., A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of
Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1389 (2008) (providing a review of social science research on
implicit gender bias in the context of analyzing whether expert testimony on implicit bias might help
finders of fact in Title VII employment discrimination litigation); see generally Rhode, Subtle Side
supra note 4; Williams, supra note 4.
48. This is not just a theme in legal scholarship, but in broader social science discourse. See
generally, Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes Prevent Women's
Ascent Up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 657 (2001) (focusing on the descriptive and
prescriptive expectations that gender stereotypes can generate); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment
Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 835 (2004); Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski, Implicit
and Explicit Attitudes Toward Female Authority, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCOL. BULL. 1315, 1315
(2000) (“To the extent that individuals associate men with career and women with domestic roles,
they may view female authorities as violating traditional gender role assignments (e.g., family
values).”).
49. See Rhode, Subtle Side, supra note 4, at 618. The argument that gender bias is unconscious
and unintentional has triggered significant scholarly debate in the Title VII realm, particularly as it
relates to the concept of “intentional” discrimination. Much of this work focuses not only on implicit
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example, gender stereotypes connecting women to the home and family may
cause colleagues to provide different attributions for men and women during a
variety of common workplace circumstances. Rhode explains, “[I]f a working
mother leaves the office early, her colleagues may infer that the reason involves
family obligations. A working father’s absence may not trigger the same
assumption.”50 Relying on this example and others, Rhode argues that gender
stereotypes account for a significant portion of the leadership gender disparity.51
Joan Williams also argues that the deeply held cognitive association
connecting women to the home and family continually affects the workplace
assumptions made by employers.52 Williams uses the example of a traditional
husband and wife couple who work for the same “high-hours employer”:
“[a]fter she had a baby, she was sent home at 5:30 p.m. every night - she had a
baby to take care of. He, on the other hand, was kept later than before the
baby’s birth - he had a family to support.”53 Williams also provides another
example from case law: a woman who had children was not considered for a
promotion because her superiors assumed she would not want a position that
gender bias and employment discrimination, but also on implicit racial bias. See Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995) (introducing the concept of unconscious
discrimination to the employment discrimination realm); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias,
“Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477 (2007) [hereinafter Bagenstos,
“Science” and Antidiscrimination Law]; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006); Faigman et al., supra note 47; Linda Hamilton
Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and
Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and
Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481 (2005); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva
La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000);
Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal
Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999).
50. Rhode, Subtle Side, supra note 4, at 618. Importantly, Rhode also notes that “[s]uch cognitive
bias can operate even if individuals’ conscious beliefs are relatively free of prejudices.” Id.; see also
Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 587-91 (1996) (explaining the
power of stereotypes in the workplace, including stereotypes that women are less committed and
less competent than men).
51. Rhode, Subtle Side, supra note 4, at 615; see also Anna M. Archer, From Legally Blonde to Miss
Congeniality: The Femininity Conundrum, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1 (2006) (focusing on the role of
films in perpetuating gender stereotypes in the legal profession and beyond); Deborah L. Rhode,
Gender and the Profession: The No-Problem Problem, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1001 (2002) (discussing the
self-reinforcing cycle of stereotypic expectations and calling for gender bias education); Laurie A.
Rudman et al., From the Laboratory to the Bench: Gender Stereotyping Research in the Courtroom, in
BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 83 (Eugene Borgida & Susan
T. Fiske eds., 2008) (noting that in the workplace, a woman’s behavior will be interpreted as
stereotype-consistent so long as there is any ambiguity).
52. Williams, supra note 4, at 406.
53. Id. at 426-27. Some scholarship focuses on the heightened stereotypes with which mothers
must contend, connecting these stereotypes to statistics showing that mothers have a harder time in
the labor market than other women. See, e.g., Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood
Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359 (2008); Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers,
Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701 (2004) (finding that mothers are perceived as less
desirable to hire and promote); Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "FReD":
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1311 (2008).
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required travel.54 The impact of Rhode and Williams’ examples is intuitive: if
people automatically and unintentionally use stereotypes to help them evaluate
women in the workplace, these stereotypes will undoubtedly have negative
impacts on career opportunities.55
The second theme that has emerged in legal scholarship is that stereotypes
about women’s work styles, character traits, and job competencies hinder
women’s ability to land and advance in high level leadership positions.
Although this theme is related to the first in that they are both based on gender
stereotypes that hinder career advancement, it differs in that the first theme
deals with women’s perceived choices (commitment to the home and family),
while the second theme relies on generalizations about women’s personalities
(work styles and character traits).56 Williams provides two clear examples of
how character or trait based gender stereotypes may arise in the workplace:
first, assertiveness in a female makes her perceived as “a bitch,” while for a male
it is perceived as a sign of strength;57 and second, social bonding behavior
among men is considered to be work related (he’s mentoring or rainmaking),
but is considered to be frivolous among women (she’s chatting or gossiping).58
These pervasive and pernicious character-related stereotypes begin a
complex interaction in which women may attempt to dispel stereotypes by
54. Williams, supra note 4, at 427. Williams gives yet another example: “a Virginia employer
terminated a woman's employment after she gave birth, reasoning that her ‘place was at home with
her child.’” Id. at 406.
55. See generally Ann Bartow, Some Dumb Girl Syndrome: Challenging and Subverting Destructive
Stereotypes of Female Attorneys, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 221; see also id. at 229-30 (2005) (noting
that “[e]ssentializing female lawyers through detrimental acts of indiscriminate generalization is
something that even profoundly feminist attorneys sometimes inadvertently or instrumentally
engage in, despite the fact that doing so may be burdensome, and at times tremendously
counterproductive”).
56. Some social science work makes a similar distinction. See, e.g., Peter Glick et al., What
Mediates Sex Discrimination in Hiring Decisions?, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 178, 180 (1988)
(conducting a resume study and suggesting the importance of stereotypes both on the personality
traits relevant to a job and the gender appropriate to that occupation). Another way social scientists
distinguish different types of gender stereotypes is by breaking them down into two categories:
descriptive and prescriptive. Descriptive stereotypes are “beliefs about the characteristics that
women do possess,” while prescriptive stereotypes are “beliefs about the characteristics that women
should possess.” Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should Be:
Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 665,
665-66 (1999) (arguing that these two types of stereotypes lead to different types of discrimination).
Faigman and his colleagues summarize empirical studies of this trait-based research by stating,
“gender stereotypes of men as agentic and women as communal are broadly shared in the
population.” Faigman et al., supra note 47, at 1426.
57. Williams, supra note 4, at 424-25. Rudman and her colleagues provide a similar example,
noting that when women behave in ways that may be necessary for a high-powered job (such as
exhibiting ambitious or dominant behavior), it can lead co-workers to reject them. Rudman et al.,
supra note 51, at 85.
58. Williams, supra note 4, at 416. Williams provides a related example focusing on stereotypes
of part-time working women: “Take a fictional woman, Mary, who worked full time before she had
children but cut her hours to part time thereafter. When Mary went part time, her employer
decreased her hourly wage rate, on the theory that women who work part time are less committed
and less competent.” Joan C. Williams, Correct Diagnosis; Wrong Cure: A Response To Professor Suk,
110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 24 (2010), http://www.columbialawreview.org/sidebar/volume/
110/24_Williams.pdf.
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changing workplace behavior. As Holning Lau proposes, a female lawyer
concerned with stereotypes of female passivity, for example, may choose not to
talk about her children “because her colleagues may be prone to infer that
women who adhere to nurturing stereotypes also adhere to passivity
stereotypes.”59 Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati present a similar perspective on
the complexity of navigating stereotype-infused relationships.60 If, for example,
a woman partner on a law firm’s hiring committee suggests that the firm’s
hiring practices discriminate against women (and assuming the employer
harbors the stereotype that female employees are hypersensitive), the authors
argue that:
[T]he employer may interpret the female employee’s criticisms of the existing
hiring procedures as knee-jerk political correctness.
Alternatively (or
additionally), the employer may conclude that the employee’s criticism reflects
unprofessional, crude, self-interested identity politics. Both interpretations reify
the stereotype about the employee (that she is hypersensitive), and will likely
cause the employer to disregard the criticism.61

These critiques reinforce the complexity of trait related stereotypes and
underscore the near impossibility of combating them completely and effectively
in the workplace.
The third theme that has emerged in legal scholarship is that because some
jobs are consciously or unconsciously perceived as male jobs, females will be
evaluated less favorably for those positions.62 As Diane Bridge contends,
because males have traditionally dominated certain positions, potential
employers’ choices will be affected by gender stereotypes about the ideal
candidate for those positions.63 This type of stereotype effect becomes

59. Holning Lau, Identity Scripts and Democratic Deliberation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 897, 906 (2010)
(arguing that “identity scripts,” such as gender stereotypes, undermine democracy, and calling upon
Equal Protection doctrine for help in restoring the democracy lost).
60. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103 (2000). Carbado
and Gulati also argue that these relationships can actually create an economic incentive for firms to
discriminate against stereotyped employees. They explain: “there is a rational economic reason to
expect discrimination. Outsiders are not only more likely to say yes to [certain difficult] tasks, they
are also more likely to be asked. This is likely to be so because: (1) outsiders are more likely to say
yes to disconfirm negative stereotypes; (2) outsiders are susceptible to quick categorization (if they
say no, it is easy to put them into the ‘bad’ category); and (3) to the extent that citizenship tasks have
to be done by someone, the employer would rather that the outsiders perform them, since the
employer may believe that outsiders are less likely to succeed anyway.” Id. at 140. These results,
they explain, reinforce the initial stereotypes. Id. at 141-45.
61. Id. at 116.
62. Bridge, supra note 25, at 608. Bridge argues that this places women workers in a “double
bind” situation: “women who behave in a stereotypical manner face underestimation of their
competence and effectiveness; while women who deviate from sex stereotypes are viewed as
displaying inappropriate masculine behavior and are labeled abrasive or maladjusted.” Id. at 60708.
63. Id. at 606 (citing Benson Rosen & Thomas H. Jerdee, Effects of Applicant’s Sex and Difficulty of
Job on Evaluations of Candidates for Managerial Positions, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 511, 512 (1974);
Michele A. Paludi & Lisa A. Strayer, What's in an Author’s Name? Differential Evaluations of
Performance as a Function of Author's Name, 12 SEX ROLES 353, 359 (1985); Barry Gerhart, Gender
Differences in Current and Starting Salaries: The Role of Performance, College Major, and Job Title, 43

Levinson_Young_proof_022311

2/23/2011 12:50:21 PM

IMPLICIT GENDER BIAS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

13

magnified in leadership jobs.64 Williams summarizes, “when a task or setting is
stereotypically masculine, as are most ‘high-powered’ jobs, the setting will
activate assumptions that associate competence with masculinity, thereby
increasing the perceived competence of men.”65 Thus, in addition to the litany
of stereotypes that may hinder women professionals generally, the highest-level
women professionals may face an additional layer of stereotypes related to the
association between certain high-level jobs and masculinity.66 One might expect
these masculine stereotypes to be most potent in powerful legal jobs, such as
appellate judge positions.67
Legal scholarship thus argues that women are hindered from career
advancement by stereotypes that peg them as home and family-focused, as well
as those that construe their personalities as weak and gossip-driven (or
conversely, as workplace cutthroats). Additionally, women in contention for
high-level positions are hindered by job-specific associations people have
between certain jobs and the men that have historically held those positions.
This powerful framework of stereotypes led us to develop our empirical study,
which tested not only whether people hold many of the implicit gender biases
described in this section, but whether those biases lead to discriminatory
decision-making in the legal profession. Before detailing the study, however,
we first describe existing empirical work that has investigated gender bias in the
legal profession.

INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 418, 430 (1990); Robert L. Dipboye et al., Sex and Physical Attractiveness of
Raters and Applicants as Determinants of Resumé Evaluations, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 288, 293 (1977)).
64. See, e.g., Rudman & Kilianski, supra note 48, at 1315-16 (surmising, “male dominance in
powerful social roles (e.g., politics, law, religion, and the military) has produced an implicit male
leader prototype. This prototype may be both cause and effect of a generalized belief that men are
superior and thus deserve to control and receive more resources than do women.”) (internal
citations omitted).
65. Williams, supra note 4, at 407. Psychological research on gender stereotypes and leadership
evaluations supports this contention. See e.g., Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and The Evaluation of
Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1992); Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role
Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573, 576 (2002); see also Marc R.
Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1073, 1073-74 (1999) (pointing out that certain
job categories can be gendered).
66. In our empirical study, we tested a similar concept, whether judges should have more
masculine or feminine traits. See infra Section IV A. Similar stereotypes connecting males to high
power legal positions may have effects outside of the hiring and promotion arena, for example, in
the way jurors react to male and female lawyers. See, e.g., Peter W. Hahn and Susan D. Clayton, The
Effects of Attorney Presentation Style, Attorney Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 533 (1996); Janet Sigal et al., The Effect of Presentation Style and Sex of Lawyer on Jury
Decision-Making Behavior, 22 PSYCHOL.: Q. J. HUM. BEHAV. 13 (1985).
67. The extra potency of male stereotypes in the judicial realm was addressed by Mary Clark.
Mary L. Clark, One Man’s Token Is Another Woman’s Breakthrough? The Appointment of the First Women
Federal Judges, 49 VILL. L. REV. 487, 541 (2004) (arguing that the appointment of female federal judges
is particularly important because it “instructs present and future generations about women’s talents,
thereby shattering stereotypes and modeling possibilities of women’s achievements”).
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III. EXAMINING GENDER DISPARITIES IN THE LAW
A. Empirical Studies
As gender disparities among practicing lawyers and judges have continued
despite twenty years of near numerical equality among law school graduates, a
limited number of scholars have begun devising empirical studies designed to
investigate the sources of these gender disparities. This subsection reviews the
few existing empirical studies on gender disparities in the legal profession and
also reviews related studies of gender disparities in academia.68 This review
concludes that women are disproportionately affected in the legal profession
and academia due to workplace expectations of masculinity and in-group
preferences among male hiring attorneys. No empirical studies, however, have
examined implicit gender biases among members of the legal profession.
A fascinating study of gender bias in law firm hiring investigated the
relationship between hiring criteria and ultimate hiring decisions. Elizabeth
Gorman hypothesized that the masculinity and femininity of law firms’
published hiring criteria would be related to gender disparities in hiring
decisions.69 To pursue this hypothesis in a sample of over 700 firms during one
hiring year, Gorman first reviewed each firm’s published hiring standards.70
Using previously established research on masculinity and femininity in
language, Gorman counted the number of stereotypically masculine (e.g.
assertive, decisive, or energetic) and feminine traits (e.g. cooperative, friendly, or
verbally oriented) in each firm’s published standards.71 She then compared the
number of masculine and feminine traits for each firm’s standards to the
number of male and female associates they hired. The results of the study
showed that for every additional masculine characteristic listed by a firm, a
woman’s chance of getting hired decreased by approximately five percent.72
This finding was significant both for entry-level attorney hires as well as for

68. For a review of empirical studies on gender bias outside of the legal profession, see Faigman
et al., supra note 47, at 1416-17 (discussing several resume studies that have found gender bias in
hiring) (citing Heather K. Davison & Michael J. Burke, Sex Discrimination in Simulated Employment
Contexts: A Meta-Analytic Investigation, 56 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 225, 232-34 (2000); Eagly et al., supra
note 65, at 7-9; Judy D. Olian et al., The Impact of Applicant Gender Compared to Qualifications on Hiring
Recommendations: A Meta-Analysis of Experimental Studies, 41 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 180, 180-95 (1988); Janet Swim et al., Joan McKay Versus John McKay: Do Gender
Stereotypes Bias Evaluations? 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 409, 414-19 (1989); Henry L. Tosi & Steven W.
Einbender, The Effects of the Type and Amount of Information in Sex Discrimination Research: A MetaAnalysis, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 712, 713-19 (1985)).
69. Elizabeth H. Gorman, Gender Stereotypes, Same-Gender Preferences, and Organizational
Variation in the Hiring of Women: Evidence from Law Firms, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 702, 705-06 (2005).
70. For example, one firm described its hiring criteria as follows: “High academic achievement,
diversity, initiative, willingness to assume responsibility, maturity, judgment, nonacademic
experience, extracurricular activities (including Law Review, Moot Court, other journals).” Id. at
709.
71. Id. (citing Sandra Bem, The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny, 42 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 155 (1974)).
72. Id. at 717.
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lateral hires.73 Gorman explains this result by focusing on the power of gender
stereotypes. She claims:
[O]rganizational decision makers perceive male and female candidates through
the lens of gender stereotypes and compare those distorted perceptions to the
cultural role-incumbent schemas that prevail within their organizations. When
those schemas are more stereotypically masculine, male candidates appear to
offer a better fit and are more likely to be selected.74

Further analysis revealed that firms that relied on more feminine hiring
criteria were only more likely to hire women attorneys at the entry level. They
did not hire more female “lateral” (i.e. higher level) attorneys.75 Gorman
analyzed this result by focusing on the strength of gender stereotypes at the
more senior levels of law firms. Although gender stereotypes at entry hiring
levels may still pose a formidable obstacle for women, as her study showed, the
additional connection between the highest level jobs and historically male roles
may create an additional hurdle. Gorman explains:
[R]ole-incumbent schemas actually are somewhat different for jobs involving
different levels of seniority and responsibility.
Stereotypically feminine
characteristics such as friendliness and cooperativeness may be more salient in
lower-level positions, which often require ‘team play’ and cheerful obedience to
superiors, than in higher positions, which are seen as demanding leadership.76

Finally, Gorman analyzed whether law firms with female hiring partners
were more likely than firms with male hiring partners to hire women associates.
The study’s results confirmed this hypothesis. Firms with women hiring
partners were in fact more likely to hire more female entry-level candidates.77
However, this effect diminished in firms where women had already achieved a
greater gender balance among firm partners.78 This result confirms that the
gender of the primary decision-maker matters, an effect consistent with what
social psychologists call “in-group bias.”79
In a separate project, Gorman collaborated with Julie Kmec to investigate
women’s promotion to partner in corporate law firms.80 Examining data on a
national basis, Gorman and Kmec compared law firms’ hiring of incoming
associates and tracked the firms’ partnership decisions when that associate
group became eligible for partner.81 The results of the study found consistent
gender bias at the upper levels of the corporate firms. Women who were hired
73. Id. at 717-18.
74. Id. at 722. This explanation echoes the conclusions of the legal scholarship reviewed in
Section II.C.
75. Lateral attorneys are those who have previously practiced law elsewhere. In Gorman’s
study, she operationalized “lateral” hires as those attorneys who graduated law school at least two
years prior to the graduating class being hired at the entry level. See id.
76. Id. at 722.
77. Id. at 719.
78. Id. at 719.
79. Id. at 707 (citing Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 554 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds. 1998)).
80. See generally Gorman & Kmec, supra note 1.
81. Id. at 1442-43.
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as entry level associates by firms were much less likely than their male
counterparts to be promoted to partner.82 Gorman and Kmec predicted that
these findings would likely hold true in other high level jobs both inside and
outside of the legal field.83 As long as decision-makers consciously or
automatically rely on gender stereotypes in making hiring and promotion
decisions, Gorman and Kmec concluded, continuing disparities should be
expected.84
Outside of the few studies in the legal profession, empirical researchers
have also focused on women’s advancement in academia.85 One particular
study regarding women in academia helps highlight a phenomenon that might
be present at the upper levels of the legal profession. This study, by Rhea
Steinpreis and her colleagues, asked a sample of psychology faculty across the
country to evaluate a Curriculum Vitae (CV).86 The study was designed so that
each professor evaluated one CV (thus, a “between subjects” design87): a female
job applicant (recent Ph.D.), a male job applicant (recent Ph.D.), a female tenure
candidate, or a male tenure candidate. Steinpreis and her colleagues drafted the
CVs such that the job applicant CVs were identical (other than a female
candidate name, Karen Miller, or a male candidate name, Brian Miller88) and the
tenure candidate CVs were similarly identical.89 The researchers hypothesized
that CVs with male names would be evaluated more favorably than the identical

82. Id. at 1455-56. Interestingly, a similar trend did not hold true for lateral partner hiring. Id.
83. Id. at 1466. For a study of gender differences in the career outcomes of men and women in a
specific legal market, see generally Kathleen E. Hull & Robert L. Nelson, Assimilation, Choice, or
Constraint? Testing Theories of Gender Differences in the Careers of Lawyers, 79 SOC. FORCES 229 (2000)
(finding unexplained gender disparities in Chicago area lawyers).
84. Gorman & Kmec, supra note 1, at 1466. In addition to focusing on the harmful effects of
both conscious and automatic stereotypes, Gorman and Kmec point to in-group favoritism (males
hire males) and reliance on gender as an indicator of competence as other causal factors. Id.
85. Although there have been few empirical studies on the topic, an abundance of nonempirical work focuses on women’s advancement in academia. See, e.g., Joe Alper, The Pipeline is
Leaking Women All the Way Along, 260 SCIENCE 409 (1993); Mary Ann Mason & Marc Goulden,
Marriage and Baby Blues: Redefining Gender Equity in the Academy, 596 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.& SOC.
SCI. 86 (2004). Some work, however, is empirical in nature. See e.g., L.S. Fidell, Empirical Verification
of Sex Discrimination in Hiring Practices in Psychology, 25 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1094 (1970); Gerhard
Sonnert & Gerald Holton, Career Patterns of Women and Men in the Sciences, 84 AM. SCIENTIST 63
(1996).
86. Rhea E. Steinpreis et al., The Impact of Gender on the Review of the Curricula Vitae of Job
Applicants and Tenure Candidates: A National Empirical Study, 41 SEX ROLES 509, 509-10 (1999).
87. It is a “between-subjects design” because each professor participated in only one of the four
conditions (i.e., reviewed one of the four CVs).
88. Id. at 515.
89. The researchers used the actual CV of a female professor, altering only a few small items.
One interesting alteration the researchers made was that they removed any indicia of membership in
female scientific groups. This was done, according to the researchers, to “to avoid inducing subjects
to hire or tenure the person because of any political ideology they may appear to have.” Id. at 515. If
the researchers had retained such information, it would have either communicated different
messages about the candidates (psychologists might react different to a female versus a male
candidate belonging to a female scientific organization) or required the researchers to change the
organization name to a male organization for the male CVs (in which case it is possible no such
organization exists).
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CVs with female names.90 The results of the study confirmed this hypothesis.91
Psychology faculty members were more likely to state that they would hire the
male candidate than the female candidate.92 Other results showed that the
faculty members claimed to support their decisions by making biased
evaluations of the candidates’ accomplishments. For example, the faculty
members were more likely to judge that the CV with the male name had
stronger research experience compared to the same CV with a female name.93
Similarly, the faculty members were more likely to state that, compared to the
female candidate, the male candidate had stronger teaching and service
experience.94
Overall, the gender bias illustrated by the results was
compelling—identical candidates were judged very differently based only on
their apparent gender.
Considered together, the empirical evidence for gender bias in the legal
profession and in academia is convincing. Notwithstanding this scholarly
progress in empirically understanding gender inequality, studies have yet to
investigate whether implicit biases might help explain the perpetuation of
gender disparities within the legal profession. We thus devised an implicit
social cognition-based empirical study designed to test the role of implicit
gender stereotypes in the legal profession. The next subsection describes how
we devised a study that attempted to bridge scholarly discourse on gender
stereotypes with existing knowledge of gender disparities in the legal profession
and academia.
B. Crafting an Empirical Study that Responds to Gender Disparity Research
In planning our empirical study, we established two goals: first, test
whether members of the legal community harbor implicit gender biases, and
second, test whether gender stereotypes affect decision-making at various levels
of the legal profession.95 These goals, of course, were influenced by both the
strengths and limitations of existing discourse. For the first goal, to test whether
members of the legal community harbor implicit gender biases, we strived to
respond as directly as possible to the themes set forth by legal scholars.96 That
is, we set out to craft a test that would examine whether members of the legal

90. Similar empirical studies using resumes that vary the name of the job applicant have been
conducted outside of the legal profession and academia. See generally supra note 68.
91. Steinpreis et al., supra note 86, at 520-22.
92. Id. at 520.
93. Id. at 521.
94. Id. There were, however, no significant differences based on gender for the tenure
candidates’ CVs. The researchers explained this finding by indicating that they may have used a CV
that was essentially too good. According to the researchers, the “vast majority” of faculty indicated
that they would tenure the candidate. Thus, it might be true that while a less outstanding candidate
might experience gender bias in tenure decisions, a top-notch candidate will be too good not to
tenure. Id. at 524.
95. Admittedly, this second goal oversimplifies things somewhat. The second goal really had
two parts: (1) to test whether people discriminate against women in the legal profession, and (2) to
test whether this discrimination (if any) would be predicted by either implicit gender bias or explicit
gender preferences.
96. These themes were outlined in Section II.C.
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community implicitly associate women with home and family, as well as
whether they associate certain high level legal positions (such as judges) with
males.97 As we describe in the next subsections, we turned to the science of
implicit social cognition (and in particular, the Implicit Association Test) to find
an empirical test that would allow us to achieve our goal.
For the second goal, to test whether gender stereotypes affect decisionmaking at various level of the legal profession, we responded to the literature by
choosing to test three separate potentially discriminatory areas of the legal
profession. First, in light of Gorman’s findings demonstrating that masculine
and feminine job-related expectations might be at least partially to blame for
some of the legal profession’s gender disparities,98 we decided to test directly
whether, for leadership positions in law, people believe that the best legal
thinkers should have masculine rather than feminine characteristics. For this
area, we decided to focus on the relationship between masculinity and
femininity and one of the most renowned positions in the legal profession, the
appellate judgeship. Second, considering that Rheinpreis and others have found
that some decision-makers evaluate male-named CVs more favorably than
identical female-named CVs,99 we resolved to create our own resume test to see
if members of the legal community display the same biases when evaluating law
student resumes. And third, because implicit stereotypes have been shown to
predict decisions such as economic decision-making (moving funds away from
already disadvantaged groups),100 we decided to test whether members of the
legal community, during a hypothetical fund shortage, would
disproportionately shift funds away from women’s lawyers organizations. Each
of these studies would also allow us to examine whether in-group biases affect
male and female participants’ decisions.
In creating our study, we also needed to decide whom to test.101 In the case
of gender bias in the legal profession, there are several possibilities. One might
choose to focus on existing decision-makers (those professionals already making
hiring and promotion decisions, such as law firm partners or members of a state
judicial selection committee), or on future decision-makers (those who are likely
to be making the key decisions in the future, such as young lawyers or law
students). We were interested in both groups. However, due to practical
considerations, such as the ease of participant recruitment, we chose to focus our
97. Of the three themes in our literature review, the one theme that we did not test in this study
is the theme connecting certain personality traits to women. This theme should be tested in future
studies.
98. See Gorman, supra note 69, at 722.
99. See Steinpreis et al., supra note 86, at 520-22. Other resume studies have found similar
results in the context of other stereotypes. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are
Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991
(2004).
100. See Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 44, at 363.
101. The selection of a study’s “population” is important in empirical research. If the
researchers’ goal, for example, is to study “teenagers,” then a researcher needs to find a sample that
reasonably approximates the entire teenage population (so, if “all teenagers” means all of the
world’s teenagers, or all of the country’s teenagers, then the researcher would need to find a sample
that represented those teenagers).
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study on future decision-makers. Because we are university-based researchers,
obtaining a law student sample—and based on recent history, likely a strong
sample of future decision-makers102—would not be difficult.103
With our preliminary goals set and the law student sample selected, we
began devising our first measure, the test of implicit gender biases. Fortunately,
within the field of implicit social cognition, exciting new studies104 have
validated ways to test for implicit biases. One of the more exciting and flexible
methodologies for testing implicit bias is the Implicit Association Test (IAT).105
Because we decided to create our own IAT as well as implement a previously
validated IAT, we provide an overview of the IAT.
1. Understanding the Implicit Association Test
The IAT measures implicit cognitions in a simple and compelling way.106 It
asks participants to categorize information as quickly as possible, and then
calculates a participant’s reaction time (in milliseconds)107 and accuracy in
completing the categorization task.108 The wisdom behind the IAT holds that
statistically significant speed and accuracy-based differences in a person’s ability
to categorize different types of information reflects something meaningful in
that person’s automatic cognitive processes.

102. Graduates from the University of Hawai'i William S. Richardson School of Law have
attained leadership positions including governor (John D. Waihee III), member of the United States
House of Representatives (Colleen Hanabusa), appellate judge (alumni who are current appellate
judges in Hawai`i include Alexa Fujise, Katherine Leonard, and Lisa Ginoza), U.S. attorney (Florence
Nakakune), lieutenant governor (James “Duke” Aiona, Jr.), law school dean (Lawrence Foster and
John Gotanda), and numerous trial judges, law firm partners and more. It would be safe to predict
that current law students will one day enter senior roles in the legal community.
103. As we discuss infra Section V, future studies should seek to test whether existing decisionmakers rely on implicit gender biases in making decisions.
104. “New” in this context means new in the history of science. The tests referred to here were
first described in scientific journals in the early and mid-1990’s. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et
al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998).
105. Within legal literature, the IAT has become a familiar symbol of implicit bias for scholars of
race because of the numerous compelling IAT-based studies that have uncovered implicit racial bias.
See, e.g., Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious
Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L. REV. 83, 101-14 (2008);
Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,”
94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 49.
106. The following three paragraphs describe the Implicit Association Test in detail. These three
paragraphs are reprinted almost verbatim, including footnotes, from Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty
by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. CRIM. L.J. 187 (2010).
107. Researchers call the measurement of reaction time “response latency.” See, e.g., Greenwald
et al., supra note 104; Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF
REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 123 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds.,
2001).
108. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes:
Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803 (2001) (summarizing that, “[w]hen highly associated targets and attributes
share the same response key, participants tend to classify them quickly and easily, whereas when
weakly associated targets and attributes share the same response key, participants tend to classify
them more slowly and with greater difficulty.”)
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The following is a detailed description of the way the IAT is typically
conducted.
Study participants, working on computers, press two predesignated keyboard keys as quickly as possible after seeing certain words or
images on the computer monitors. The words and images that participants see
are grouped into meaningful categories. These categories require participants to
“pair an attitude object (for example, man or woman. . .) with either an
evaluative dimension (for example, good or bad) or an attribute dimension (for
example, home or career, science or arts). . . .”109 Participants complete multiple
trials of the pairing tasks, such that researchers can measure how participants
perform in matching each of the concepts with each of the other concepts. For
example, in one trial of the most well-known IATs, participants pair the
concepts Good/White together by pressing a designated response key and the
concepts Bad/Black together with a different response key. After completion of
the trial, participants then pair the opposite concepts with each other, here
Good/Black and Bad/White.110 The computer software that gathers the data111
measures the number of milliseconds it takes for participants to respond to each
task. Scientists can then analyze (by comparing reaction times and error rates
using a statistic called “D-prime”112) whether participants hold implicit
associations between the attitude object and dimension tested. Results of IATs
conducted on race, for example, consistently show that “white Americans
express a strong ‘white preference’ on the IAT.”113
As a measure, the IAT is quite flexible. Researchers have created dozens of
different kinds of IATs.
Some examples include: Gender/Science IAT,
Gay/Straight IAT, Obama/McCain IAT, and the Fat/Thin IAT, among many
others.114 The Gender/Science IAT, for example, requires participants to group
together male and female photos with science and liberal arts words. It
consistently shows that people associate men with science and women with
liberal arts. It is worth noting the flexibility of the IAT to test either evaluative
dimension words (such as grouping Male/Female with Good/Bad), or attribute
dimension words (such as grouping Male/Female with Career/Family). The
IAT we created, the Judge/Gender IAT, requires participants to group together
male and female names and Judge and Paralegal related words (attribute
dimension words). As we will discuss, our empirical study of the IAT tested

109. Levinson, supra note 23, at 355 (citing Banaji, supra note 107, at 123).
110. Because participants may naturally be quicker at responding with one of their hands,
participants complete these tasks twice, once for each response key, to eliminate differences based on
hand preference. The order of the IAT tasks is also usually randomized to reduce order effects.
111. In our empirical study, we used the software Inquisit, produced by Millisecond Software.
112. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: I. An
Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197 (2003).
113. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV 1195, 1199 (2009); see also Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL
L. REV. 599, 612 (2009) (citing Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from
a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 105 (2002)).
114. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/selectatest.html (last visited Oct.
25, 2010).
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both the Judge/Gender IAT and the Gender/Career IAT, both of which we will
describe in detail.115
2. The IAT in Legal Studies
Although a handful of legal scholars have employed IATs in empirical
work,116 just two projects have created new IATs for application in the legal
domain.117 A brief description of these projects illuminates the possibilities and
potential for using IATs in the context of gender discrimination. In one such
project, Levinson, Cai, and Young desired to test whether there was an implicit
presumption of guilt for black defendants on trial.118 Noting the flexibility of
certain social cognition measures (including the IAT) for adoption into relevant
legal domains, and encouraging future projects to create new IATs, the
researchers created a Guilty/Not Guilty IAT that tested whether people
associate black people with criminal guilt. The results of the study confirmed
the authors’ hypothesis, finding first, that people implicitly associate black
people (compared to white people) with guilty,119 and second, that people’s
levels of implicit bias predicted the way they evaluated evidence in a criminal
trial.120
In another project, Jerry Kang and his colleagues created an IAT in order to
test whether jurors rely on implicit ethnic biases when evaluating the
performance of litigators.121 In particular, the researchers were interested in
how mock jurors would evaluate Asian male litigators compared to white male
litigators.122 They hypothesized that participants would associate white males
with traits commonly associated with successful litigators (for example,
eloquent, charismatic, and verbal) relative to Asian males, who would be more
likely to be associated with traits commonly assigned to successful scientists.

115. Greenwald et al., supra note 104.
116. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1542-44 (2004) (using a paper and pencil version of the IAT to test
whether capital defense attorneys harbor implicit racial biases); Rachlinski et al., supra note 113, at
1198-1208 (testing a large sample of judges for implicit racial bias).
117. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 113, at 1204–05 (citing Robert Livingston, When Motivation
Isn’t Enough: Evidence of Unintentional Deliberative Discrimination Under Conditions of Response
Ambiguity 9-10 (2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review); Arnd
Florack et al., Der Einfluss Wahrgenommener Bedrohung auf die NutzungAutomatischer Assoziationen bei
der Personenbeurteilung [The Impact of Perceived Threat on the Use of Automatic Associations in Person
Judgments], 32 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE 249 (2001)).
118. Levinson et al., supra note 106.
119. Id. at 17.
120. Id. at 19 (explaining what the IAT did and did not predict).
121. Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEG STUD. (forthcoming, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1442119.
122. Id. at 10 (explaining that the researchers intentionally did not examine ethnicity effects for
women attorneys. “Our strategy was not to ignore gender, but to control for it, based on past
evidence showing that lawyers are expected to be men rather than women . . . . As such, we expected
that implicit and explicit stereotypes about ideal lawyers would activate thoughts of White men
more than Asian men, but would not much activate thoughts of women of either race.” (internal
citations omitted)).
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The results confirmed their hypothesis.123 Participants did in fact implicitly
associate white males with traits commonly assigned to successful litigators.
Furthermore, these implicit associations predicted their judgments of white and
Asian litigators’ performance in a mock trial.124 That is, participants with higher
levels of implicit bias were more likely to favor the white litigators’
performances.
These two IAT-based projects demonstrate that, so long as the categories
researchers are interested in fit the IAT paradigm (which is typically, although
not always, dichotomous), new IATs may be created to test further law related
hypotheses. We believed that testing implicit gender bias in the legal context
(and specifically testing implicit associations between men and judges,
compared to women and paralegals) was one endeavor that would be well
served by the IAT. The next Section describes the study we conducted in detail,
beginning with the IAT we created.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
We designed an empirical study to test whether implicit gender biases may
be driving gender discrimination in the legal profession. This Section reports on
the details of study, including the research methods, study materials, and
results.
The centerpieces of the empirical study were two IATs, the Judge/Gender
IAT and the Gender/Career IAT, the first of which we created uniquely for this
study and the second of which was adopted from a well-established social
science test.125 We developed the Judge/Gender IAT and selected the
Career/Gender IAT for this study because they closely mirrored the themes of

123. Id. at 16-20.
124. Mock jurors’ explicit preferences also predicted evaluations of litigator performance. As
these results show, the IAT is useful not just because it is a creative and reliable measure of implicit
attitudes and stereotypes. It is also valuable because it has been shown to predict the way people
behave and make decisions. See generally Anthony Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the
Implicit Association Test: III. Meta Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17
(2009) (showing that the IAT predicts behaviors in many circumstances). It should be noted,
however, that although the majority of research supports this claim, there has been vigorous debate
over it. See e.g., Hart Blanton et al., Strong Claims and Weak Evidence: Reassessing the Predictive Validity
of the IAT, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 567 (2009) (disputing the results of prior articles that claim the race
IAT predicts behaviors); Hart Blanton et al., Transparency Should Trump Trust: Rejoinder to McConnell
and Leibold (2009) and Ziegert and Hanges (2009), 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 598 (2009) (maintaining
skepticism about whether the IAT reliably predicts discriminatory behavior). But see, e.g., Allen R.
McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Weak Criticisms and Selective Evidence: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009), 94 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 583 (2009) (responding to Blanton et al.’s critique); Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J.
Hanges, Strong Rebuttal for Weak Criticisms: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009), 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 590
(2009) (criticizing Blanton et al.’s critique of their prior data). Similar debates have appeared in the
legal literature. See Bagenstos, “Science” and Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 49, at 484-90; Adam
Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to Situationist
Insights, 57 EMORY L. J. 1087, 1135-43 (2008). See generally Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social
Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427 (2007); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts
Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 737 (2009); Gregory Mitchell & Philip Tetlock,
Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006); Amy L. Wax, The
Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979 (2008).
125. Nosek et al., supra note 113, at 101 (reporting results from 600,000 IATs).
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legal scholarship on implicit gender bias. Recall the first theme in the legal
scholarship outlined in Section II—women are subordinated because they are
typically assumed to place greater emphasis on the home and family.126 The
Career/Gender IAT allowed us to test whether law students implicitly associate
males with work and females with home and family. Recall the third theme in
the legal scholarship—certain high status leadership roles are assumed to be
male jobs, and female applicants are thus automatically evaluated less
favorably. The Judge/Gender IAT allowed us to test whether law students
associate judges with males and paralegals with females. The IATs thus became
the centerpieces of our study, because they allowed us to test whether members
of the legal profession (here, law students) hold the implicit gender biases that
scholars have been most concerned about.
We also developed further tests, both to determine whether law students
display gender bias in decision-making, as well as to test whether implicit biases
predict that discriminatory decision-making.
These additional measures
consisted of a judicial appointments measure, a law firm hiring measure, and
student organization budget cut measure. We also included a measure of
explicit gender bias: the Modern Sexism Scale. We ran these studies on a
participant pool of law students.127
A. Measures
There were six major components to the study, including two IATs, a
judicial appointments measure, a law firm hiring test, a budget cut task, and an
explicit gender bias scale. Here, we provide specifics on each of the measures.
1. Gender Implicit Association Tests
The first measure we designed was the Judge/Gender IAT. This test, like
other IATs, requires participants to group together traits and attributes as
quickly as possible and allows researchers to measure the strength of association
between categories. We were specifically interested in whether members of the
legal community consider judges, one of the most prestigious legal positions, as
an “implicit male leader prototype.”128 Thus, the Judge/Gender IAT requires
participants to group together words representing judges and paralegals with
male and female names.129 We could therefore test whether participants held
implicit associations between men and judges and women and paralegals, as we
predicted they would.
We next included a well-established IAT: the Gender/Career IAT.130
Although this test is not directly related to law, it tests implicit associations
related to gender and the workplace, as well as gender and home. Running this

126. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
127. Students received candy, but no other compensation, for participating in the study.
128. See Rudman & Kilianski, supra note 48, at 1315-16.
129. The words used to represent “Judges” were: Make Decision, Court, Preside, Opinion, and
Robes. The words used to represent “Paralegals” were: Notetaker, Legal Assistant, Filing, Answer
Phone, and Helper. The names used were Josh, Brandon, Peter, Ian, and Andrew for men, and
Emily, Donna, Debbie, Katherine, and Jane for women.
130. Nosek et al., supra note 113.
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IAT on law students allowed us to test whether implicit gender stereotypes
connecting women to home and family may be pervasive in the legal
profession.131 In the Career/Gender IAT, participants group together words
representing career and home with male and female names.132 Consistent with
commentators’ arguments, we predicted that study participants implicitly
associate male with career and female with home. Participants completed the
two IATs in counterbalanced order, such that some participants completed the
Judge/Gender IAT first and some completed the Gender/Career IAT first. 133
The next three measures were not specific measures of implicit associations
or stereotypes, but were measures we designed to test other ways gender biases
might function in the legal profession. We selected three distinct areas: (1)
judicial appointments, (2) law firm hiring, and (3) budget cuts.
2. Judicial Appointments Measure
The Judicial Appointments measure was designed to test participants’
gendered assessments of high-level legal positions.
This measure asks
participants to rate the characteristics most important in the appointment of
appellate level judges. In designing the measure, we selected potential judicial
characteristics that were masculine, feminine, and neutral in nature. A pre-test
on separate participants confirmed which characteristics were masculine and
which were feminine.134 Masculine characteristics included, for example, firm
and competitive.135 Feminine characteristics included, for example, empathic
and compassionate.136 Participants were instructed: “Based on your experience
studying law and reading numerous judicial opinions, we are interested in your
perceptions of the qualities that appellate judges should possess. Please read the
following attributes and indicate on a scale of 1-7 how important it is for a judge
to possess each attribute. Once again, we are interested in the attributes that
appellate judges (those at the court of appeals level and higher, both in the
federal and state system) should possess.” Participants then viewed the
masculine, feminine, and neutral words one at a time,137 and rated each
characteristic on a 7-point scale, ranging from “not important” (1) to “very
important” (7). With this methodology, we could evaluate whether members of
the legal community believe that appellate judges should possess more
131. Scholars have predicted as much. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
132. The words used to represent “Career” were: Management, Professional, Corporation,
Salary, and Office. The words used to represent “Home” were: Home, Parents, Children, Family,
and Relatives. The names used were Ben, John, Daniel, Paul, and Jeffrey for men, and Julia,
Michelle, Anna, Emily, Rebecca for women.
133. In addition, the IATs were counterbalanced, such that within each IAT, participants
encountered the tasks in varying orders. This counterbalancing was designed to eliminate order
effects.
134. In the pre-test, we provided a separate group of participants with a list of words and asked
them to rate the masculinity or femininity of those words on a seven-point scale. We only selected
the masculine, feminine, and neutral words that had substantial pre-test agreement.
135. The other masculine characteristics were: Aggressive, Leader, Powerful, Risk-Taker, and
Self-Assured.
136. The other feminine characteristics were: Cautious, Gentle, Sympathetic, Thoughtful, and
Warm.
137. The words were presented in random order.
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masculine or feminine traits. We predicted, first, that participants would select
more masculine than feminine traits for appellate judges, and second, that the
implicit bias measured by the IATs would predict these results.138
3. Law Firm Hiring Test
The Law Firm Hiring test was designed to measure whether gender affects
hiring of law firm candidates. In this test, participants are informed that they
are the hiring partner of a local law firm (with about 20 partners), and that there
were two candidates vying for a final job slot as a summer associate. They are
instructed: “There are two candidates remaining, and you plan to hire one of
them. It is your job to choose the candidate. Please review both resumes in the
envelope marked ‘Resumes’ on your desk, and answer the questions that will
appear on your computer screen.” They then review the resumes of each of the
candidates. The first names of the two candidates are varied, such that all
participants see the same two resumes (which we call Resume A and Resume B),
but some participants see Resume A with a woman’s name (Ashley), while other
participants see Resume A with a man’s name (David).139 All participants
review the same two resumes.140 After reviewing the resumes, participants are
asked to recommend the hiring of one of the candidates, and are also asked
specific questions about the strengths and weaknesses of the candidates. We
predicted that men and women would be hired in equal numbers. We made
this prediction because we believed the “glass ceiling” to be significantly above
the summer associate level. Although we would have preferred to test resumes
of more senior lawyers (e.g. associates on the partnership track),141 due to our
law student population, it was most realistic to ask about entry-level
decisions.142
4. Budget Cut
The Budget Cut measure was designed to test whether participants would
allocate resources away from a women’s law student organization and towards
other student organizations in the face of a budget crisis. In this measure,
participants are informed that budget cuts are occurring to national student

138. That is, we predicted that the greater the implicit bias measured by the IAT, the greater the
selection would be of masculine traits.
139. Candidate A’s last name was Suzuki and Candidate B’s last name was Tanagawa. We
intentionally chose Japanese-American surnames for the candidates because Japanese-American law
students comprise one of the largest groups of law students at the University of Hawai`i (along with
European-Americans) and one of the largest groups of attorneys in the Honolulu market. There are,
of course, relevant stereotypes to Japanese Americans in Hawai`i, just as there are with European
Americans. For more on local stereotypes in Hawai`i, see Eric Yamamoto, The Significance of Local, in
SOCIAL PROCESSES IN HAWAI`I 138, 138-49 (Peter Manicus ed., 1974). In light of the fact that gender
and ethnicity each have unique stereotypes that would likely affect the evaluation of resumes, we
controlled for ethnicity by selecting the same apparent ethnicity for both candidates. We believed
that Japanese-American stereotypes would be more consistent than European-American stereotypes,
and thus selected a Japanese-American name for the resume.
140. See infra App. A.
141. If we had done so, we would have predicted that men would be hired more than women.
142. Future studies should strive to test more relevant populations for investigating law firm
decision-making at the partnership level, for example.

Levinson_Young_proof_022311

26 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/23/2011 12:50:21 PM

Volume 18:1 2010

organizations and their input is needed as guidance for how to implement
budget cuts. They are then provided with a list of six student organizations,
including the Women Lawyers Association. The list contains “current” budget
allocations (ranging from $1650 to $2750) for each of the organizations and
provides a target amount of total cuts (20% or approximately $2550 total).
Participants then fill in new recommended amounts for each organization.
Other than the Women Lawyers Association, the other student organizations
listed in the measure include the Public Interest Law Association, The Criminal
Justice Society, The Environmental Law Group, Moot Court (All Teams), and
Law and Business Society. We predicted first that participants would reduce the
budget of the Women Lawyer’s Association by a greater percentage than most
of the other groups, and that these budget reductions would be predicted by the
participants’ implicit gender biases.143
5. Modern Sexism Scale
Participants also completed a Modern Sexism Scale. This scale is designed
to measure explicit, as contrasted with implicit, gender bias towards women.144
The scale asks participants to respond to statements, such as “[d]iscrimination
against women is no longer a problem in the United States.”145 Participants
respond to eight such statements on a numerical scale and their responses are
tallied and converted into a final score.
Regarding these non-IAT measures, it is important to note that we could
evaluate statistically not only the results of each of the measures, but also
whether the IATs (or the results on the Modern Sexism Scale) predicted the
responses on these measures. More specifically, we could examine whether
implicit gender biases predicted judgments on the resume measure, the judicial
appointment measure, and the financial allocation measure.
B. Methods
Participants were recruited from the law school library at the University of
Hawai’i William S. Richardson School of Law. Fifty-five participants completed
the study. Data for five of the participants was dropped because those
participants had lived outside of the United States for more than ten years.146
The remaining fifty participants included eight 1L’s, thirty 2L’s, and twelve 3L’s.

143. That is, we predicted that the greater the implicit bias measured by the IAT, the greater the
budget cut would be for the Women Lawyers Association.
144. See Janet K. Swim et al., Sexism and Racism: Old-fashioned and Modern Prejudices, 68 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 199, 212 (1995).
145. See id. (Other items in the Modern Sexism Scale include, “2. Women often miss out on good
jobs due to sexual discrimination. 3. It is rare to see women treated in a sexist manner on television.
4. On average, people in our society treat husbands and wives equally. 5. Society has reached the
point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievement. 6. It is easy to understand
the anger of women’s groups in America. 7. It is easy to understand why women’s groups are still
concerned about societal limitations of women’s opportunities. 8. Over the past few years, the
government and news media have been showing more concern about the treatment of women than
is warranted by women’s actual experiences.”).
146. Some of these participants were international LL.M. students. We dropped the data for
these participants because, for this study, we were interested in stereotypes in the United States.
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There was gender balance in the participant pool. Twenty-four of the
participants were male and twenty-six were female. The population was
ethnically diverse. Forty-six percent identified themselves as Asian American,147
twenty-four percent as White/Euro-American, twelve percent as multi-racial,
eight percent as Native Hawaiian, six percent as Pacific Islander, two percent as
Latino/Hispanic, and two percent identified as Other. The mean age of the
participants was 26.48. Two female research assistants recruited participants
and conducted the study.148 Participants completed the study in a laboratory
with two separate computer stations.149 Participants first completed the nonimplicit measures, which were given to them in counterbalanced order.150 Next,
participants completed the IATs, which were also given to them in
counterbalanced order.151 At the end of the study the participants provided
demographic information.
1. Limitations of the Study
A few limitations of the study should be clarified. First, it is important to
highlight that the Research Assistants (who recruited participants and
administered the study) were both female second year law students. There are
several potential confounds that this method of recruitment introduced. First, it
is possible that running the study with female research assistants (in a position
of authority) altered the way participants responded to questions. For example,
interacting with women functioning successfully in authority roles might
temporarily help to combat implicit and explicit biases.152 Second, it is also
possible that interacting with the female research assistants created a
confirmation bias. That is, if participants believed that the administrators were
members of their University’s women’s lawyers group, for example, participants
may have been more hesitant to cut funding to that group. Or, more simply, if
the participants believed that the women research assistants wanted them to
select the female resume, they may have acted in accordance with that
expectation. Third, not only were the two female research assistants functioning
in an authority role, but also at the time of the study they were successful
students. Thus, using two academically successful female research assistants
may have unintentionally created exemplar effects, such that it would be easier

147. Of the Asian participants (N=23), ten identified themselves as Japanese-American, six
identified themselves as Chinese-American, three identified themselves as Korean-American, and
four identified themselves as Other.
148. These research assistants were both second-year law students.
149. The computers were IBM desktop computers outfitted with Inquisit software. This software
is one of the favorites used by reaction-time (such as the IAT) researchers.
150. The IATs were given after these measures so that participants would not be alerted as to the
gendered theme of the study.
151. In addition, the IATs themselves were counterbalanced such that the order of the IAT tasks
was presented differently.
152. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to Counterstereotypic
Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 645 (2004) (finding that certain types of exposure to female role models
temporarily reduced implicit bias).

Levinson_Young_proof_022311

28 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/23/2011 12:50:21 PM

Volume 18:1 2010

for participants to value judge’s feminine characteristics or to hire a female
summer associate.153
Future studies should thus avoid using only female recruiters and
administrators, and should endeavor to use administrators who are less known
to the law student community (e.g. non-law student confederates). It should
also be noted that participants were only recruited as volunteers (candy was
provided as a thank you) and were not paid for their participation. Thus, there
may have been an altruism effect, whereby more altruistic students were more
likely to participate in the study. These students might not proportionally
represent the law student population with regard to their decision-making. For
example, perhaps altruistic students would be more likely to favor a public
interest student organization compared to a business law organization in the
budget cut measure.
C. Results
1. Implicit Associations between Judge/Male and Paralegal/Female
As predicted, the first IAT, the Judge/Gender IAT, confirmed the
hypothesis that law students hold implicit gender biases related to leadership
positions in the legal profession.154 Participants displayed a significant
association between Judge and Male (M=822.48) compared to Judge and Female
(M=1035.18), producing a significant IAT effect (D=.23, t(49)=3.66, p=.001). The
results support the conclusion that law students implicitly associate men with
judges, and women with paralegals, and therefore harbor an “implicit male
leader prototype” in the legal setting.155
2. Implicit Associations between Work/Male and Home/Female
As hypothesized, the second IAT, the Gender/Career IAT, confirmed the
hypothesis that law students hold implicit gender biases connecting women
with the home and family. Participants displayed a significant association
between Male and Career (M=850.37) compared to Female and Career
(M=1101.60), producing a significant IAT effect (D=.33, t(49)=6.87, p>.001). The
results of this study support the conclusion that law students implicitly associate

153. For more on the potential implicit bias reducing effects of exemplars, see Kang & Banaji,
supra note 105.
154. In computing our results, we followed the scoring algorithms suggested by Greenwald and
his colleagues. See Greenwald et al., supra note 112 (demonstrating that despite the complicated
nature of the IAT and disagreement among social scientists about the best way to score it, scholars
have generally agreed on an accepted algorithm since 2003); see also Levinson et al., supra note 106, at
17 (citing Greenwald et al., supra note 112) (“Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji’s suggested improved
scoring measure for the IAT, called a D score, has improved test-response detection (for instance, it
throws out indiscriminate responses or responses that indicate a lack of attention) and incorporates
an inclusive standard deviation for all congruent trials (for instance, both the practice and test block
of white-guilty and black-not guilty). Mean latencies are computed for each block, and
complimentary blocks are subtracted from each other (e.g., practice white-not guilty and blackguilty would be subtracted from practice white-guilty and black-not guilty). These two difference
scores are divided by their inclusive standard deviation score, and the average of these two scores is
called D.”).
155. See Rudman & Kilianski, supra note 48, at 1315-16.
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men with work and women with the home and family. These results replicated
previous research outside of the legal profession.156
3. Relationship Between the Judge/Gender IAT and Gender/Career IAT
Because we created a new IAT, the Judge/Gender IAT, we were interested
in whether it measured implicit constructs similar to the already established
Career/Gender IAT. We thus conducted a correlational analysis. This analysis
found that the two IAT scores (Judge/Gender, Career/Gender) were weakly,
but significantly, correlated (R=.33, p=.02). This result suggests that while the
two IATs tap into a similar general construct (gender bias), each IAT also
measures a unique association.
4. The IATs and the Modern Sexism Scale
We also tested whether the responses to either of the IATs would be related
to responses on the Modern Sexism Scale, in which participants report explicit
gender attitudes. As predicted, neither of the IATs were correlated with the
Modern Sexism Scale (p>.1). This result is expected, first because implicit and
explicit measures are intended to test different constructs, and second because
the Modern Sexism Scale is designed to test responses to somewhat different
societal issues than the IATs we implemented. The difference between the
responses to the IATs and the Modern Sexism Scale demonstrates the
importance of investigating both implicit gender biases and explicit gender
attitudes.157
5. Judicial Appointments
For the judicial appointments measure, participants rated masculine and
feminine judge attributes to be equally important (Mdiff=.5, t(49)=.47, p>.1).158
However, individuals’ scores were not correlated (R=.162, p>.1), suggesting that
there were individual differences in how attributes were rated. We thus were
able to investigate whether implicit biases from the IATs predicted gender bias
in the responses to the judicial appointments measure, as we hypothesized they
would. A difference score was created by subtracting feminine judge attributes
from male judge attributes, so that higher difference scores indicated a
preference for masculine judge traits. A multiple regression analysis was run to
156. See Nosek et al., supra note 113, at 105 (reporting results on the gender-career IAT). Due to
the nature of the IATs we conducted (it may become quickly apparent what the researchers are
testing), our experiment was constructed so that the non-implicit experimental measures were
always conducted before the IATs were taken.
Analysis suggests that the experimental
manipulation of seeing a female paired with an international resume and a male paired with a
general business significantly lowered both Judge/Gender (F=23.53, p>.001) and Career/Gender
(F=16.17, p>.001) IATs.
157. Measuring explicit gender attitudes without also investigating implicit gender biases would
overlook the science underlying the field of implicit social cognition.
158. Analysis suggested that eliminating two items from the Judge Attribute scale would
increase reliability of the scale. The two words were “Cautious” and “Risk-Taker.” The resulting
Cronbach’s alpha was acceptable (=.76). The remaining terms were split into two groups based on
pre-testing of words to create a Masculine Attribute Scale (Aggressive, Competitive, Firm, Leader,
Powerful, Risk-taker, and Self-Assured) and a Feminine Attribute Scale (Compassionate, Empathic,
Gentle, Sympathetic, Thoughtful, Warm).
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determine if implicit scores (from both the Judge/Gender and the
Gender/Career IATs) predicted an emphasis on feminine or masculine traits.159
The overall regression model was significant (F=6.06, p>.001), and explains
41% of the variance of the dependent variable (R2=.41). The main effects of
gender of participant (b=5.307, t=3.04, p<.05), Career/Gender IAT score (b=18.42, t=-4.93, p<.05), and Judge/Gender IAT score (b=9.727, t=3.21, p<.05) all
significantly predicted the difference between importance for masculine and
feminine judge attributes. The interactions between participant gender and
Career/Gender IAT (b=20.79, t=3.753, p<.05) and participant gender and
Judge/Gender IAT (b=-10.686, t=-2.511, p<.05) were also significant predictors.
Importantly, these interaction effects tell us that implicit bias predicted
responses on the judicial appointments measure, but that the results differed
depending on the gender of the participant.160 Therefore, we report the results
separately for male and female participants.
For the male participant regression model,161 there were two interesting
results demonstrating the IATs’ predictive validity, but in different directions.
First, as implicit associations between male and judge increased, ratings of
masculine judge attributes increased as compared to female judge attributes
(B=9.727). That is, the more implicit bias the participants displayed linking
judges to males, the more they preferred masculine judge attributes. This
finding supported our hypothesis that implicit gender bias would predict biased
decision-making. Second, as implicit associations between home and female
increased on the Career-Gender IAT, ratings of feminine judge attributes
increased as compared to masculine judge attributes (B=-18.416). Put simply,
the more implicit bias male participants displayed linking men to career, the
more they preferred feminine judge attributes. The direction of this finding was
thus not as we predicted.
For the female participant regression model,162 there were also two results
demonstrating predictive validity, but similar to the male participant regression,
the results were in different directions. First, as implicit associations between
female and home increased on the Career/Gender IAT, the gap between ratings
of masculine and feminine judge attributes increased (B=2.375). Put simply, the
more implicit bias the participants displayed linking men to career, the more

159. Since preliminary analysis demonstrated that females had a higher (m=1.57) preference for
masculine attributes, while males had a higher (m=-2.75) preference for feminine traits in judges,
gender and gender’s interactions with the two IAT scores were included in the model. To control for
multicolinearity, the IAT scores were centered around their means. The regression model was:
Judge Attribute Difference Score = -3.845 + (Gender)* 5.307 + (Centered d_home)* -18.416 +
(Centered d_law)* 9.727 + (gender*d_home)* 20.791 + (gender*d_law)* -10.686.
160. Since the variable of gender is coded as either a 0 (male) or a 1 (female), there are, in effect,
two regression models, one for male participants and one for female participants. These models are
best interpreted separately.
161. Male Regression Model: Judge Attribute Difference Score = -3.845 + (Centered d_home)* 18.416 + (Centered d_law)* 9.727. For this model, males with an average implicit score for both IATs
gave higher ratings of feminine judge attributes than masculine judge attributes.
162. Female Regression Model: Judge Attribute Difference Score = 1.462 + (Centered d_home)*
2.375 + (Centered d_law)* -.959. For this model, females with average IAT scores (in this case
slightly biased) rated masculine judge attributes slightly higher than female judge attributes
(B=1.462).
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they preferred masculine judge attributes. The direction of this finding was as
we predicted. Second, as implicit associations between male and judge
increased on the Judge/Gender IAT, ratings of feminine judge attributes
increased as compared to masculine judge attributes (B=-.959). That is, the more
implicit bias female participants displayed linking men to career, the more they
preferred feminine judge attributes. The direction of this finding was thus not
as we predicted. These interesting predictive validity results deserve further
exploration, a task we will consider in subsection D.
6. Resume Study
Consistent with our hypothesis, participants hired the male and female job
candidates at approximately the same rates, regardless of participant gender or
the resume they saw (2=.00, p>.05; (2=2.35, p>.05). Ashley was hired slightly
more (N=31) than David (N=19) for the summer position, although the
difference was not statistically significant. The gender of the participants was
also not a significant factor in determining which candidate was hired.
However, there was a trend here as well: male participants hired Ashley more
(N=17) than female participants (N=14), while female participants hired David
more (N=12) than male participants (N=7). Male participants decided to hire
Ashley more often when she was paired with an international resume (N=14)
than with a business resume (N=4), suggesting that something about the female
candidate with an international interest163 appeared to impress participants.
Ashley was rated higher than David on all ratings of the resume, though
many of these differences were small. Paired t-tests demonstrated that
participants rated Ashley as more likely to succeed as a summer associate
(Mdiff=.18, t(49)=2.64, p>.05) and to receive an offer at the end of the summer
(Mdiff=.12, t(49)=2.20, p>.05 ). Participants also gave Ashley a significantly
higher overall rating (Mdiff=.180, t(49)=2.137, p>.05). These ratings demonstrate
that law students do not penalize female entry-level law candidates, and in
some cases prefer them. This was true, of course, despite the implicit biases
displayed by the participants.
A logistic regression was run to determine if either implicit measure
predicted hiring decisions. The model did not approach significance (all p’s>.1).
This result indicates that participants’ implicit biases did not likely affect their
choice of resume.
7. Budget Cuts
Participants cut the budget in ways that were not equal across groups, but
the cuts did not disadvantage the Women Lawyers Association in comparison to
other groups. There were no gender differences on budget cuts; male and
female participants made budget cuts similarly. The average amount cut from a
group was 19%. Participants cut 15% from the Public Interest Law Association,
20% from Women Lawyers Association, 20% from Criminal Justice Society, 19%
from the Environmental Law Group, 17% from Moot Court, and 25% from the
Law and Business Society. The closeness of the cuts to the desired 20% cut
demonstrates that participants preferred to make fairly equal cuts to all groups.
163. See infra App. A.
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The target group, Women Lawyers Association, did not differ significantly from
the other budget cuts (Mdiff =.00, t(.58), p>.05). IAT scores were not correlated
with these differences, nor did it significantly predict them in a regression. This
result indicates that participants’ implicit biases did not likely affect their budget
cuts.
D. Interpreting the Empirical Results
The results of our empirical study paint a picture of implicit gender bias in
the legal profession that is both concerning and hopeful. The concerning part is
that the law student participants consistently held implicit gender biases, and
they did so on both the Judge/Gender IAT and the Career/Gender IAT.
Contextualized within legal scholarship on gender stereotypes, these results
confirm that law students associate men with career and women with home and
family, as well as hold implicit male prototypes for the position of judge.
Considered within the broader social science discourse, these findings document
the existence of implicit gender bias in the legal profession, and also show that
the job specific associations people hold can be implicit in nature.164 The hopeful
part of the results is that the participants were mostly able to resist their implicit
biases and make decisions in non-biased ways. Namely, participants did not
discriminate against women in the judicial appointments measure, the resume
study, or the budget cut measure. In fact, in some instances, such as in the
resume study, participants rated the female candidate more favorably than the
male candidate. The remainder of this subsection interprets the results in more
detail.
The results indicate that implicit gender bias affected the participants on
both IAT measures. But what do these results mean? As social psychologists
have surmised, implicit associations often predict the way people act and make
important decisions.165 For example, one study found that participants who
showed more implicit bias on a White/Black IAT acted differently towards
blacks,166 and a subsequent study by different researchers found that it even
predicted discriminatory behavior (such as making racial epithets).167 A study
on medical decision-making and race found that doctors with high implicit
racial bias were less likely to order certain medical procedures for their black
patients.168 And, directly relevant to gender bias in the legal profession, a
researcher found that employers in Sweden who harbored implicit biases
related to Arabs were less likely to call Arab candidates for job interviews.169 If

164. Of some complication to our analysis is that participants’ implicit biases only sometimes
predicted their decisions, such as in the judicial appointments study, and that these results were
multidirectional and difficult to interpret.
165. See Greenwald et al., supra note 124; Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 44.
166. John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 65-67 (2002).
167. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 44, at 361-63.
168. Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007).
169. See Siri Carpenter, Buried Prejudice: The Bigot in Your Brain, SCI. AM. MIND, May 2008, at 32,
37 (citing Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence (Inst. for the Study of
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law students hold the implicit biases that were documented in this study, we
must wonder whether they are truly able to navigate their professional lives
without acting on those stereotypes. Studies of gender bias in law firm
partnership decisions, for example, heighten this concern.170
Building on the research linking implicit biases to discriminatory actions,
we designed the non-implicit measures to test whether law student participants
would act on their implicit biases or whether they might resist them. The
majority of our results support the argument that our law student participants
successfully resisted or compensated for the implicit biases we tested.171 First,
they did not act in a discriminatory manner to women. And second, the results
of their IATs did not predict their decisions on the non-implicit measures, other
than the judicial appointments measure. And even for that particular measure,
only some of the results indicated that the IATs predicted gender discrimination
in the expected manner. Other results showed that participants sometimes
acted in ways directly contrary to their implicit biases. There are several
possibilities that might explain why the participants in our study harbored
implicit biases but for the most part did not act on them. Here, we briefly
consider these possibilities, focusing on the two strongest rationales.
First, participants may have been successful in resisting their implicit biases
if they were implicitly motivated to control the influence of prejudicial
stereotypes. Researchers have found that some participants can overcome their
implicit biases either because they have high implicit motivations to avoid
prejudice or they are temporarily influenced by their egalitarian
surroundings.172 Jack Glaser and Eric Knowles, for example, had participants
take unique IATs that were designed first to test people’s implicit motivation to
avoid prejudice, and second to test how much they implicitly considered
themselves prejudiced.173 They also had participants complete a “shooter bias”
task, which measures how people respond to visual images of black and white
men with guns and non-gun objects in a video game-like setting, asking them
either to shoot armed men as quickly as possible or to press a “safety” button
when unarmed men appear.174 Glaser and Knowles found that the more the

Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2764, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=984432).
170. See generally Gorman & Kmec, supra note 80.
171. It is also possible that the participants’ implicit biases might better predict gender-biased
behaviors that we did not include in our study.
172. Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 164 (2008); Adam R. Pearson et al., The Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: Insights from
Aversive Racism, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 1, 15 (2009).
173. Glaser & Knowles, supra note 172, at 166-67.
174. Id. at 166. See also Levinson, supra note 23, at 357 (citing Joshua Correll et al., The Police
Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1321, 1325 (2002)) (describing shooter bias studies in more detail,
“participants play a video game that instructs them to shoot perpetrators (who are holding guns) as
fast as they can but not to shoot innocent bystanders (who are unarmed but holding a non-gun
object, such as a cell phone). The ‘shooter bias’ refers to participants’ propensity to shoot Black
perpetrators more quickly and more frequently than White perpetrators and to decide not to shoot
White bystanders more quickly and frequently than Black bystanders. Studies have also shown that
participants more quickly identify handguns as weapons after seeing a Black face, and more quickly
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participants were implicitly motivated to avoid prejudice, the less bias they
displayed on the shooter bias measure.175 Furthermore, they showed that the
worst performers on the shooter bias measure were those who not only had low
implicit motivation to control prejudice, but also did not implicitly consider
themselves as prejudiced.176
The researchers therefore demonstrated that it is possible for people to hold
harmful implicit biases and simultaneously hold egalitarian implicit norms that
allow them to resist these biases. Related research has supported the idea that
people who hold implicit egalitarian norms (even if they are only temporarily
activated) can resist stereotypic thought activation.177 Considered in the context
of the results of our study, it is possible that a large part of our law student
sample was implicitly motivated to resist gender bias. Although it might seem
unlikely that the majority of our participants would hold such implicit views
when the majority of the broader population likely does not, we might note that
law students generally, and these law students in particular,178 could have
higher than average levels of implicit motivation to control prejudice.179 After
all, research has demonstrated that simply being in the presence of “egalitarianminded others” can inhibit prejudice.180 Without having tested for implicit
motivation to control bias, however, we cannot speculate further as to whether
that might account for the some of the results. Future studies on law students
could test this possibility.
A second possible explanation why our participants were able to control
the effects of their implicit biases is that they may have suspected the purpose of
the study. In a study of implicit racial biases in trial judges, Jeffrey Rachlinski
and his colleagues found that judges harbored implicit biases on the IAT
favoring whites compared to blacks.181 In a subsequent measure, when race was
primed implicitly, the researchers found that white judges’ sentencing decisions
were predicted by their IAT scores.182 However, when race was made explicit in
yet another measure, the white judges’ decisions were no longer predicted by
identify other objects (such as tools) as nonweapons after seeing a White face. In these studies,
participants are entirely unaware that they have even seen a White or Black face. The quick flashing
image registers in the unconscious; participants are not consciously aware of the prime.”).
175. Glaser & Knowles, supra note 172, at 169-70.
176. Id. at 170.
177. Pearson et al., supra note 172, at 15.
178. There may be a unique emphasis on justice and egalitarian values at the University of
Hawai`i law school. For example, all entering law students take the following pledge: “In the study
of law, I will conscientiously prepare myself: To advance the interests of those I serve before my
own, [t]o approach my responsibilities and colleagues with integrity, professionalism, and civility,
[t]o guard zealously legal, civil and human rights which are the birthright of all people, [a]nd, above
all, [t]o endeavor always to seek justice. This I do pledge.” Law Students’ Pledge, WILLIAM S.
RICHARDSON SCH. OF LAW, UNIV. OF HAW. AT MANOA, http://www.law.hawaii.edu/students/lawstudents-pledge (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
179. See Williams, supra note 4, at 447 (making a similar point that could explain how some law
students may have heightened ability to control their implicit biases: “stereotypes may be automatic,
but when actors are under social pressure to control them, they tend to do so.”). Certain law school
environments might create such a social pressure.
180. Pearson et al., supra note 172, at 16.
181. Rachlinski et al., supra note 113, at 1210.
182. Id. at 1215-16.
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their IAT scores.183 Interestingly, Rachlinski and his colleagues found that most
of the judges they tested had suspected the purpose of their experiment was to
test for race effects, even though the race-relevant goal of the study should not
have been obvious. The researchers explained that when participants suspect
the purpose of a study, they may take actions in response to that suspicion.184
Such a response may include an increase in implicit or explicit motivation to
control prejudice.185
Similar to Rachlinski and his colleagues’ study, it is possible that here, too,
participants suspected the purpose of the study. Two particular aspects of our
methodology could have reinforced this belief: first, participants each saw one
female resume and one male resume; and second, our study used only female
law students as study administrators. Regarding the first possibility, other
resume studies, such as Steinpreis’ study of CVs, have only used one CV in a
between subjects design.186 In those studies, participants only see one CV, and
therefore likely have no reason to suspect that gender is being tested. In our
study, however, we created a forced choice by providing two somewhat
comparable resumes, one with a male name and another with a female name.
We chose this structure for the resume study because we believed it created a
more realistic decision where participants would have more than one resume to
review. Yet, its drawback may have been that it flagged the true purpose of the
study to participants. Regarding the second possibility, it is also possible that
participants’ suspicions were created or heightened by the fact that our study
was administered by two second year female law students.187 Unfortunately, we
did not include a measure that would have tested whether participants
suspected the purpose of the study. The results of our study thus reinforce the
dangers of implicit bias in the legal profession, as well as invigorate the hope
that law students may have ways to compensate for their implicit biases. Future
research should continue to investigate implicit bias in law schools specifically
and in the legal profession more broadly. The next section makes specific

183. Id. at 1217-19.
184. Id. at 1203 (citing Green et al., supra note 168, at 1237). Rachlinski and his colleagues
considered that implicit motivation to control prejudice might have accounted for their results: “We
believe that the data demonstrate that the white judges were attempting to compensate for
unconscious racial biases in their decisionmaking. These judges were, we believe, highly motivated
to avoid making biased judgments, at least in our study. When the materials identified the race of
the defendant in a prominent way, the white judges probably engaged in cognitive correction to
avoid the appearance of bias.” Id. at 1223.
185. See id. at 1223 (considering that implicit motivation to control prejudice might have
accounted for study results. “We believe that the data demonstrate that the white judges were
attempting to compensate for unconscious racial biases in their decisionmaking. These judges were,
we believe, highly motivated to avoid making biased judgments, at least in our study. When the
materials identified the race of the defendant in a prominent way, the white judges probably
engaged in cognitive correction to avoid the appearance of bias.”).
186. See Steinpreis et al., supra note 86, at 515.
187. It should be noted that second-year law students are the typical candidates for summer
associate positions and that the empirical study was conducted during the fall semester, the
traditional hiring season for summer associate positions. Thus, participants might have believed
that the study had some particular relevance or importance to the administrators, who were
presumably taking part in the summer associate interview process.
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recommendations for this research, and then discusses what to do about
pervasive implicit gender biases in the legal profession.
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A. The Next Generation of Research
Although our research provided detailed information about implicit
gender biases of law school students, further empirical testing should continue
to investigate implicit gender bias in the legal profession. Conducting
additional empirical research would provide both an opportunity to test new
hypotheses about implicit gender bias in the legal profession, as well as allow a
chance to improve on the current study. Here, we suggest several simple but
worthy amendments that would improve the current study for future testing.
First, for studies focused on implicit bias in the law school setting, these studies
should examine a broader group of law students across multiple law schools.
Using a broader sample would eliminate the possibility that there was
something unique about our one school sample that influenced participant
responses.188 Second, whether or not the studies are conducted in law schools,
future studies should always be conducted using researchers who are
completely unknown to the participants.189 Doing so will reduce the possibility
that participants will speculate about the purpose of the study, or attempt to
(implicitly or explicitly) please the researchers with their responses. Third,
future studies should employ both male and female test administrators, and
subsequent to the studies, should test whether the gender of the researchers
affected participants’ responses.190 Although we do not know if our particular
research design was compromised by any undesired affects, taking the steps
described above will help minimize such risks.
There are yet additional amendments to the current study worth pursuing.
Expansion of empirical testing beyond the law school domain is an important
step in investigating the role of implicit gender bias in the legal profession.
Although student participants might be easier to recruit, future research should
test at least two new participant groups: current decision makers (such as law
firm partners) and future decision makers (perhaps those five to ten years out of
188. There are some unique aspects of the University of Hawai`i law school that could influence
how implicit biases predict decisions. For example, it is one of the most diverse law schools in the
nation. See University of Hawaii at Manoa William S. Richardson School of Law, THE PRINCETON REVIEW,
http://www.princetonreview.com/UniversityofHawaiiatManoaSchoolofLaw.aspx (last visited
Nov. 12, 2010) (ranking the law school first nationally as “best environment for minority law
students”). It is possible that the positive influences of diversity lead to motivations to resist implicit
biases. The law school’s mission also highlights the school’s commitment to “social and economic
justice,” a theme consistent with the law school pledge that all first year students take. See THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I WILLIAM S. RICHARDSON SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.hawaii.edu (last
visited Nov. 13, 2010); see also supra note 178.
189. Using law student research assistants to conduct the study risks biasing the results,
particularly if the students are known as exemplary students. Researchers should also seek to
compensate student participants in order to minimize altruism effects.
190. See Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, supra note 19, at 515 (showing that simply
exposing study participants to a researcher from a stereotyped group can have effects on the
participants’ decision-making).
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law school). Conducting a study on these two groups would allow researchers
to gain an understanding of whether there are differences in implicit gender bias
at different levels of the legal profession.191 It would also allow for adaptation of
the resume study to encompass a job search for a more senior attorney position.
Such a position, as the legal scholarship points out, is more likely to be subject to
gender biases than entry-level positions, such as the summer associate hiring
scenario we tested.192
Finally, future research can build on our study by adding a third implicit
measure of stereotypes. Although we employed two implicit measures that
specifically responded to two major themes of legal scholarship, there is one
additional theme that remains untested. That theme—that gender biases
relating to women’s traits and characteristics affect hiring and promotion
opportunities—should also be included in empirical studies of implicit gender
biases in the legal profession. Researchers have previously found that some
implicit stereotypes can predict decision-making when non-stereotype related
implicit associations fail to do so.193 Thus, we recommend including an implicit
stereotype measure in future studies.
B. Addressing Implicit Gender Bias
Remedies are needed to counter the harmful effects of implicit gender bias
in the legal profession. Legal scholars have already done a thorough job in
proposing systematic responses to gender stereotypes in the workplace. Rhode,
for example, calls for a multifaceted approach that includes screening of
performance evaluations for gender stereotypes,194 increased mentoring
activities and women’s networks,195 a redefinition of workplace assumptions to
take into account female life patterns,196 gender neutralizing policies like
parental leaves and flexible schedules,197 and a commitment to accountability
from employers, complete with measurement systems.198 This scholarship
should serve as a jumping off point for discussions of remedies to implicit
gender bias in the legal profession, as well as for the development of empirical
tests that measure the efficacy of these remedies.199 Encouraging law firms to
implement gender-neutral policies, or asking that law schools, the American Bar
Association, and the Association of American Law Schools support enrollment
and course credit flexibility due to family status are straightforward solutions
that should be considered and pursued.
191. It might also reveal generational differences.
192. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
193. See Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 44, at 359 (finding that stereotype IATs predicted
decision-making but attitude IATs did not).
194. Rhode Subtle Side, supra note 4, at 638.
195. Id. at 638-39 (pointing out the particular need to keep “talented women, particularly women
of color, from falling through the cracks”).
196. Id. at 639-40.
197. Id. at 639.
198. Id. at 640-42. On a related note, Rhode argues that employers should be held responsible for
the reinforcement of gender stereotypes concerning appearance. Id. at 642.
199. Rhode has made this later point. See id. at 637-38 (noting the conflicting results of workplace
diversity training, and calling for more thorough studies).
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Here, we propose two potential interventions aimed specifically at
reducing implicit gender bias within law schools and throughout the legal
profession.200 These proposals are: first, implement a series of carefully crafted
and empirically tested bias reduction training courses beginning in law school
and continuing throughout law graduates’ careers; and second, encourage law
schools, firms, and other agencies to commit to hiring women for implicit male
prototype jobs. Although neither of these suggestions will fully combat the
harmful stereotypes that people form as children, both of them can be linked to
social science research demonstrating the reduction of implicit bias. Thus, short
of a more uniform solution to implicit gender bias, which would likely entail
slow and steady cultural change,201 we advocate for short-term bias reduction
strategies.
Implementing a carefully crafted and empirically verified training that
begins in law school and continues throughout attorneys’ legal careers has the
potential to reduce implicit gender biases of both law students and lawyers. The
content of the trainings, undoubtedly its most important element, is nearly
matched in significance by the necessity of implementing a consistent,
continuous, and long-term training program. After all, most bias reduction
strategies are only temporary measures. One cannot expect a simple training, or
even a few sparse courses, to come close to permanently reversing the harmful
effects of negative stereotypes. In fact, it is likely that the benefits gained even
by a sustained program of trainings would be small, although measurable.
Thus, the trainings must be regular and continue throughout attorneys’
careers.202
Although bias-related training already exists and is prevalent in some
industries,203 here we note two elements that we believe should be incorporated
in all training. These elements include diversity and multiculturalism training,
as well as carefully confronting trainees with their own biases. Multiculturalism
training in particular has been successful in reducing implicit biases. Jennifer
Richeson and Richard Nussbaum designed a study where participants learned
about either multiculturalism (celebrating differences across groups) or “color
200. We hope and expect that these suggestions will overlap with scholars’ suggestions
regarding dealing with gender stereotypes outside of the legal profession. Here, we pursue them
specifically from an implicit-bias-reduction standpoint.
201. We hope, of course, that such cultural change is possible.
202. We do not engage with the mechanics of this suggestion here, although working directly
with bar associations to implement mandatory trainings would be a first step.
203. Fortunately, scholars in various fields have considered how to reduce the dangerous harms
caused by implicit biases and stereotypes. Within the medical profession in particular, attention has
been given to devising training programs geared towards eliminating health care disparities. A plan
suggested by Diana Burgess and her colleagues, including social psychologist Jon Dovidio, set forth
a systematic approach to reduce bias-driven health care disparities. Diana Burgess et al., Reducing
Racial Bias Among Health Care Providers: Lessons from Social-Cognitive Psychology, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 882, 882 (2007) (centering approach on five goals, each based on research on how to reduce the
effects of biases on decisions: “l) enhance internal motivation to reduce bias, while avoiding external
pressure; 2) increase understanding about the psychological basis of bias; 3) enhance providers’
confidence in their ability to successfully interact with socially dissimilar patients; 4) enhance
emotional regulation skills; and 5) improve the ability to build partnerships with patients.”).
Although this plan was designed for training medical students and doctors, much of its socialscience wisdom can be applied to law students and lawyers.
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blindness” (ignoring differences across groups).204 After finishing the short
lesson, participants completed a Black/White IAT. Richeson and Nussbaum
found that participants who learned about multiculturalism displayed lesser
implicit biases than those who learned about color blindness.205 A related study
by Laurie Rudman and her colleagues put participants through a fourteen-week
diversity training course where participants learned about intergroup conflict,
engaged in discussions, and maintained journals.206 The researchers found that
participants in the training displayed less implicit and explicit bias than
participants in a control group.207 Lessons from these studies could likely be
extrapolated to combat gender biases, especially if gender is included as an
element of the training.
Researchers have also found that carefully confronting people with their
biases can reduce implicit bias. A study by Alexander Czopp and his colleagues
on reducing racial stereotypes found that even though confrontations can create
hostility toward a confronter, they can (at least temporarily) also reduce
stereotypes.208 The study asked participants to participate in an online chat.209
During this chat, the experimenters asked participants to give their impressions
about pictures and statements. These pictures and statements were designed
deliberately so that participants would necessarily respond in a racially
stereotype-consistent manner, thus allowing the experimenter to set up a
confrontation.210
After the participants gave their stereotype-consistent
responses, a collaborator (who was posing as another participant in the online
chat) confronted them about their potentially racist responses.211 After the
confrontation, participants were given a confidential stereotype test
(participants were alone—no collaborator was present to influence or confront
them). The researchers found that post-confrontation participant responses
displayed significantly fewer stereotypes (compared to responses given before
the confrontation). Although this study was conducted in the context of racial
stereotypes rather than gender stereotypes, the theory behind it should hold
true for reducing gender stereotypes as well. It should be cautioned, however,

204. See generally Jennifer A. Richeson & Richard J. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism
Versus Color-Blindness on Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 417 (2004). Participants read
a lesson about their assigned topic and wrote about what they learned. Id. at 419.
205. Id. at 420.
206. Laurie A. Rudman et al., “Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice
and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856 (2001).
207. Id. at 860-61.
208. Alexander M. Czopp et al., Standing up for a Change: Reducing Bias Through Interpersonal
Confrontation, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 784, 799 (2006). The description of the study by
Czopp and his colleagues, including footnotes, is taken substantially verbatim. See Levinson, supra
note 23, at 413-14.
209. Czopp et al., supra note 208, at 787.
210. Id. at 787-88.
211. Id. at 792. For example, one such confrontation included the following: “but maybe it would
be good to think about Blacks in other ways that are a little more fair? it [sic] just seems that a lot of
times Blacks don’t get equal treatment in our society. you [sic] know what i [sic] mean?” Id. at 788.
Whether in the form of low-level threats (such as the one quoted) or high-level threats (which
involved mentioning that the participant’s responses sounded racist), confrontations successfully
reduced “subsequent stereotypic responding.” Id. at 791.
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that although these proposals are based on empirical research, they should be
tested empirically before being implemented. This is particularly the case
because some studies have found that certain bias reduction trainings might
actually heighten some biases.212 Confronting trainees with their biases, in
particular, must be done in a thoughtful and controlled manner that fosters
introspection and avoids defensive responses.
A second intervention for reducing implicit biases would be for members
of the legal profession to commit to hiring women in counterstereotypical
(implicit male prototype) roles.213 Making such a policy choice for the purpose
of implicit gender bias reduction can be supported by social science evidence.214
Studies have demonstrated that exposing students to female exemplars,
including women judges and professors, actually does reduce implicit gender
biases. In a leading study on implicit gender bias reduction, Nilanjana
Dasgupta and Shaki Asgari tested whether exposing female college student
participants to women in counterstereotypic roles would reduce implicit gender
biases.215 The researchers tested their hypothesis by studying the effect of
counterstereotypic exemplars on both short-term and long-term bias reduction.
In the first study, they examined whether teaching female college students about
female leaders would reduce their gender stereotypes of women as supporting
figures (rather than leaders). To do this, the researchers had participants review
photos and short biographies of counterstereotypic women, including Supreme
Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.216
They then conducted a
stereotype/gender IAT in which participants had to group together male and
female names with attributes of leaders and supporters.217 They found that
participants who had learned about the women leaders displayed less implicit
gender bias than members of the control group218; these participants more
quickly grouped together women with leadership attributes on the IAT.219
In the second portion of their study, Dasgupta and Asgari investigated
whether implicit bias reduction benefits could be obtained naturally through
potentially counterstereotype rich real-world settings, such as college campuses.
They compared two groups of women participants, those in an all women’s
college with those in a coeducational college, hypothesizing that due to the
underrepresentation of women leaders at co-ed colleges, women in a women’s
212. Rhode, Subtle Side, supra note 4, at 637.
213. For a discussion of specific countertypical exemplars, see Kang & Banaji, supra note 105, at
1109.
214. There is also some precedent for making the commitment to hire more women for
counterstereotypic roles. Although their actions have not been binding, the Hawai`i state senate
adopted a resolution urging the appointment of more women judges. S. Res. 26, 25th Leg. (Haw.
2010).
215. See generally Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note 152.
216. Id at 646. Other counterstereotypic leaders included business leaders, scientists, and
politicians. Id. at 645.
217. Id. at 646.
218. Id at 647. Members of the control group had seen photos of flowers and read descriptions of
those flowers. Id. at 646.
219. Id. at 647. For the researchers’ summary, see id. at 648 (“Situations that familiarize [women]
with ingroup members who have succeeded in atypical leadership domains can have a strong
impact on their automatic beliefs.”).
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college would display lesser implicit gender biases after one year of college.220
To make sure that their participants had essentially equivalent levels of bias
before college began, they tested the women both at the beginning of college and
again after one year. They were thus able to conclude, when they analyzed the
results, that although the women displayed nearly equal implicit gender biases
upon beginning college, the women at the all women’s college (but not the
women at the co-ed college) displayed almost no automatic biases after one
year.221 In addition, they found that these results were driven by the number of
women professors that the students had; the more female professors the
students had, the less the implicit gender bias they expressed.222 Dasgupta and
Asgari’s study demonstrates the exciting potential for real world situations to
reduce real world biases; colleges that make a commitment to women faculty
members will be sending a bias reducing message. Making a commitment to
hire women in implicit male prototype positions in the legal profession will not
only help reverse years of numerical disparities, but will likely have a bias
reducing affect on the next generation.223
VI. CONCLUSION
The continuing subordination of women in the legal profession must be
challenged and remedied. We believe that one of the best ways to remedy an
inequality is to understand it as fully as possible. The study we conducted
began the empirical inquiry into implicit gender bias in the legal profession, and
it confirmed that implicit gender bias is in fact widely present among a law
student sample. Yet, it also showed that in some circumstances law students
have the ability to control the effects of their own gender biases. This finding
offers hope for future generations of attorneys, professors, and judges. Yet, it is
not enough for the present day. Statistics demonstrate that decades of
inequality in the legal profession have only shown slight amelioration. Further
research must continue to examine these inequities and investigate pathways to
gender equality.

220. Id. at 645.
221. Id. at 651. In fact, implicit gender biases for the women in co-ed college went up, while
implicit gender biases for the women in an all women’s college were essentially gone. Id.
222. Id.
223. As Dasgupta and Asgari summarize, “the more frequently counterstereotypic exemplars
occur in the social environment the greater may be the decrement in automatic stereotyping.” Id. at
644.
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APPENDIX A
ASHLEY SUZUKI [OR] DAVID SUZUKI
2211 Kainoa Road, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822
Phone: 808-358-7940, Email: suzuki@hawaii.edu
EDUCATION
William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu,
Hawaii
Juris Doctorate candidate, expected graduation May 2011.
GPA: 3.56; Rank 19 out of 92
Honors and Awards:
 President, Law and Business Organization
 Staff Writer, Law Review
 Winner: Susan B. McKay Oral Advocacy Competition, Fall 2009
Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
 Bachelor of Business Administration, Focus on Real Estate
Finance, May 2005
 Honors: Magna cum laude
 GPA: 3.74
 Wilson Scholarship Recipient
 2nd Place Winner: Undergraduate Business Plan Competition
London School of Economics, United Kingdom
 Study abroad, Marketing & Management, Fall 2004
WORK EXPERIENCE
Summer Intern, Office of the County Clerk, Hilo, Hawaii, Summer 2009
 Researched and responded to legal inquiries from Council
Members and the County Clerk.
 Briefed, catalogued, and organized Office of Information Practice
opinions.
Sales Manager, Hoku Scientific, Honolulu, Hawaii, Sept. 2005-July 2008.
 Coordinated sales efforts in Asia-Pacific Region.
 Worked directly with executive team to generate sales strategy.
 Implemented multi-tiered sales strategy and met sales milestones.
Real Estate Assistant, Caldwell Pacific Realty, Honolulu, Hawaii, Summer
2004
 Researched and provided market analysis.
 Supported office operations.
LANGUAGES & ACTIVITIES
Fluent in Spanish. Trained in making presentations. Hobbies include
calligraphy and tennis.
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ASHLEY TANIGAWA [OR] DAVID TANAGAWA
2375 Woodlawn Drive • Honolulu, HI 96822 • (808) 988-3211 •
tanigawa@hawaii.edu
EDUCATION
University of Hawaii, William S. Richardson School of Law, Honolulu, HI
Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2011
Class Rank: 17 of 92 GPA: 3.60
 Law Review, Staff Writer
 Pacific-Asian Legal Studies Organization, President
Honors:
 Top grade in Legal Practice II, Spring 2009
Columbia University, New York, NY
Bachelor of Arts in International Relations, May 2005
GPA: 3.68 Cum Laude
 Minor in History
 Hawaii Club, Vice President
Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
International Exchange Program, 2005-2006
 Intensive Japanese language instruction
EXPERIENCE
Honorable Ian Johnson, U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California Summer 2009
Judicial Extern, Los Angeles, CA
 Conducted extensive researched and drafted memoranda on
various legal issues.
 Observed courtroom activities such as criminal trials and oral
arguments.
Port of Kobe 2007-2008
Coordinator for International Relations, Kobe, Japan
 Edited English articles written by Japanese Port Guides. Assisted
in translating letters, e-mails, and speeches from Japanese into
English.
Pacific Region Marketing Group 2005-2007
Marketing Manager, Honolulu, HI
 Facilitated strategic planning sessions.
special events and press conferences.

Planned and executed
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Hawaii State Capitol Summer 2004
Summer Volunteer, Honolulu, HI
 Fielded incoming telephone calls at the Governor’s Office of
Information and drafted letters on behalf of Governor Linda
Lingle. Led tours of the Hawaii State Capitol.
SKILLS AND INTERESTS
Proficient in reading/writing/speaking Japanese. Enjoy hiking and
playing soccer.

